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REGIONALISM: THE SECOND-BEST OPTION? 
C. O’NEAL TAYLOR* 
“[Developing countries] need to recognize . . . that they are living in a second-
best world, in which international economic integration remains incomplete 
due to the transaction costs . . . . [L]iving in a second-best world requires 
second-best strategies.” 
 Professor Dani Rodrik1 
INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between regionalism and multilateralism has entered a 
new phase from the perspective of developing countries.  The World Trade 
Organization (WTO) initiated the Doha Round in 2001 with an explicit 
commitment in the Doha Development Agenda2 to address the concerns of its 
largest group of member states—the developing and least developed 
countries—and redress some of the imbalances put in place during the 
Uruguay Round.3  In the last five years, however, the WTO has struggled and 
 
* Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law, A.B. Harvard-Radcliffe, J.D. University of 
Georgia, LL.M. Georgetown University Law Center.  The author would like to thank the editorial 
board of the Public Law Review for the invitation to speak at this symposium and its assistance 
with this article.  The author also wishes to acknowledge the invaluable insights offered by 
International Trade Commissioner Irving A. Williamson that helped shape the prescriptive 
section of the article.  Finally, the author would like to express gratitude for the able research 
assistance by Justin Jenson (J.D., South Texas College of Law, 2009). 
 1. Dani Rodrik, How to Save Globalization from its Cheerleaders (Sept. 2007) 
(unpublished paper, Harvard University), available at http:ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/saving 
%20globalization.pdf. 
 2. World Trade Organization (WTO), Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration], available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.pdf.  The preamble to the 
Ministerial Declaration launching the Doha Round notes that trade plays a major role in “the 
promotion of economic development and the alleviation of property” and expresses the consensus 
of the member states that the WTO “seek[s] to place their needs and interests at the heart of the 
Work Programme adopted in this Declaration.”  Id.  In each section of the Work Programme, the 
WTO commits itself to issues of particular concern for developing countries.  Id. 
 3. See Frank J. Garcia, Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 291, 292–98 (2004) (noting that the Uruguay Round (UR) bargain accepted by the 
developing countries—exchanging discipline over trade in services and intellectual property for 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
156 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII:155 
failed to deliver a comprehensive agreement truly focused on development 
issues.  Instead, the negotiations were formally suspended in 2006 and, despite 
the continued informal meetings, have not yet resolved impasses on 
agricultural trade and industrial goods4 that led to the suspension.  At the same 
time, regionalism has continued to grow at a faster pace than ever before.  
Almost seventy regional agreements were notified to the WTO from 2003 to 
2008.5  There is widespread agreement that this pace has been in response to, 
as it has been since the 1990s, the status of, or lack of progress in, the 
multilateral trading system.6  When the WTO does not deliver continued trade 
liberalization and growth opportunities, countries begin seeking alternative 
paths to trade liberalization and trade reform.  A comprehensive Doha Round 
Agreement that opens up areas of export advantage for developing countries 
 
market access in textiles and agriculture—was a bad bargain).  Two problems had to be faced by 
developing countries following the UR and the creation of the WTO.  First, the promised market 
access in developed countries failed to materialize.  Id. at 298.  Second, the UR agreements 
allowed transition periods to phase in implementation of obligations as the only real help for 
implementation. Id. at 297–99.  Implementation has proven extremely difficult for many 
developing countries given the breadth of the new obligations and the drain they have taken on 
resources.  See also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Trade 
and Development Report, 2006, UNCTAD/TDR/2006 (2006) [hereinafter Trade and 
Development Report, 2006], available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdr2006_en.pdf.  The 
Uruguay Round was seen as forcing developing countries to renounce the autonomy other 
countries had during industrialization.  Id. at 222.  Additionally the bargain of the round (TRIPS 
for Agriculture) has not really worked out.  Id.  See generally Asoke Mukerji, Developing 
Countries and the WTO: Issues of Implementation, 34 J. WORLD TRADE 33, 39–64 (2000). 
 4. Press Release, WTO, Lamy Says New Negotiating Texts Set Stage for Crucial July 
Talks (July 10, 2008), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres08_e/pr536_e.htm (arguing that 
the trouble with Doha Round is about just more than these impasses).  See Meredith Kolsky 
Lewis, WTO Winners and Losers: The Trade and Development Disconnet, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 
165, 169 (2007) (Lewis states that “[t]he impasse is in part a reflection of the fact  that the United 
States and EC are not willing to sacrifice their own protectionist measures, and as such any 
statements they make regarding the importance of development assistance ring hollow.”). 
 5. See WTO, Regional Trade Agreements Notified to the GATT/WTO and in Force, Aug. 
10, 2008, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/eif_e.xls.  Statistics such as these are 
somewhat misleading.  These regional agreements consist of new agreements as well as 
additional notifications to the WTO when an agreement is reactivated.  Id.  In addition, each 
expansion of the EC requires another notification.  Id. 
 6. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Trade and 
Development Report, 2007, U.N. Doc.  UNCTAD/TDR/2007 (2007) [hereinafter Trade and 
Development Report, 2007], available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdr2007_en.pdf.  The 
report quotes the 2003 statement made by then U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick after 
the stalemate at the WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun.  Id. at 56.  It is worth quoting the 
language as it stands as the official position of the United States at the time.  U.S. actions since 
2003 have only affirmed this position.  “We will not passively accept a veto over America’s drive 
to open markets.  We want to encourage reformers who favor free trade.  If others do not want to 
move forward, the United States will move ahead with those who do.”  Id. 
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while still meeting the overall goals of the developed countries would offer the 
largest opportunities for growth for the world trading system.7  Developing and 
developed countries alike, however, have been unwilling for different reasons8 
to exercise only this option.  Instead, they have been pursuing regionalism as a 
second-best option toward trade liberalization and economic growth. 
This article attempts to address and analyze two issues: (1) how well the 
second-best regionalism option meets the expectations, needs and capabilities 
of developing countries and (2) how this option could be improved to address 
development issues. Given the pace of regionalism and its breadth 
(encompassing not only North-South agreements but also South-South 
agreements9), one article cannot completely address all of the relevant issues.  
Consequently, this article will examine the U.S. approach to regionalism in its 
most recent free trade agreements (FTAs) with developing countries.10  The 
 
 7. See generally Sungjoon Cho, Doha’s Development, 25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 165 (2007) 
(reviewing the history of the Doha Round Suspension and prospects for its renewal). 
 8. See infra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 9. North-South refers to agreements between developed and developing countries.  South-
South agreements are those between developing countries.  See Roberto V. Fiorentino, Luis 
Verdeja & Christelle Toqueboeuf, The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements: 2006 
Update, Discussion Paper No. 12  (WTO 2007), available at  http://www.wto.org/english/ 
res_e/booksp_e/discussion_papers12a_e.pdf.  According to this WTO review of regionalism, 
there are several trends and characteristics to the newest proliferation of regional trade 
agreements (RTAs).  For most countries, RTAs have become the centerpiece of their commercial 
policy.  RTAs show an increasing level of sophistication covering services and trade areas, 
reaching both multilateral disciplines.  There is an increase in North-South RTAs and their 
“gradual replacement of long-established non-reciprocal systems and preferences.”  Id. at 2.  
There has also been an increase in the number of South-South RTAs.  Id. 
 10. The most recent U.S. free trade agreements are those negotiated or enacted under the 
Bush administration.  The following represents a chronological list of the agreements and their 
enactment in the United States as of 2008.  See Agreement Between the United States of America 
and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, 
Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63 (2002) [hereinafter U.S.-Jordan FTA], available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Jordan/asset_upload_file250_5112.pdf; 
United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S-Sing., May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 (2003)  
[hereinafter U.S.-Singapore FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/ 
Singapore_FTA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html; United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 
U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 (2003) [hereinafter U.S.-Chile FTA], available at 
http://ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html; United 
States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., May 19, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1248 (2004)  
[hereinafter U.S.-Australia FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/ 
Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html; United States-Morocco Free Trade 
Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, June 15, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544 (2005) [hereinafter U.S.-Morocco 
FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/FInal_Text-
Section_Index.html; The United States-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade 
Agreement, U.S.-CAFTA-DR, Jan. 28, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514 (2004) [hereinafter DR-CAFTA], 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_Final_Texts/ 
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article will focus on a number of questions from the perspective of both the 
United States and its developing country partners: Why regionalism? What 
kind of regionalism? Does the U.S. approach to regionalism deliver what 
developing countries need? Can the U.S. approach be made more responsive to 
development issues and concerns? 
These issues and questions regarding the developing countries and their 
needs are worth considering in light of the pattern emerging in regionalism 
efforts over the last half decade.  The percentage of new regional agreements 
between developed and developing countries has grown substantially.11  These 
new agreements also have largely been bilateral agreements between one 
developing country and one of the world’s largest and most powerful 
developed states either, the European Community (EC) or the United States.12  
 
Section_Index.html; Agreement between the Government of the United States and the 
Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain on the Establishment of a Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-
Bahr., Sept. 14, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544 (2005) [hereinafter U.S.-Bahrain FTA], available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Bahrain_FTA/final_texts/Section_Index.html; 
United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Oman, Jan. 19, 2006 [hereinafter U.S.-Oman 
FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Oman_FTA/Final_Text/ 
Section_Index.html; U.S.-Peru (2007), United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-
Peru, Apr. 12, 2006 [hereinafter U.S.-Peru FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_ 
Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html; United States-Panama Trade 
Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Pan., June 28, 2007 [hereinafter U.S.-Panama FTA], available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Panama_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html; 
United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Colom., Nov. 22, 2006 [hereinafter 
U.S.-Colombia FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Colombia_ 
FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.htm; United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Korea, 
Jun. 30, 2007 [hereinafter KORUS], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/ 
Bilateral/Republic_of_Korea_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html.  See generally OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR), EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE 
PRESIDENT’S 2008 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF 
THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, 107–15 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 
TRADE POLICY AGENDA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_ 
Publications/2008/2008_Trade_Policy_Agenda/asset_upload_file649_14563.pdf. This article will 
draw most heavily on illustrations from the most recent agreements pursued by the United States 
in Latin America—DR-CAFTA, Peru, Panama, and Colombia. 
 11. Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 55 (noting that agreements 
between developed and developing countries have grown from 14% to 27% of total regional 
agreements from 1995 to 2007).  While most regional trade agreements are South-South 
agreements, it is the North-South agreements which have a greater impact on the multilateral 
trading system since they are capable of taking attention away from multilateral negotiations and 
have a greater impact on its core principle, most favored nation treatment.  UNCTAD, 
Globalization for Development: The International Trade Perspective, §1.7, U.N. DOC. 
UNCTAD/DITC/2007/1 (2008) [hereinafter Globalization for Development], available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditc20071_en.pdf. 
 12. Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 56 n.8.  The EC has also been 
negotiating with six regional bodies of countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP), 
former colonial countries with which it has had a long-standing series of preference agreements to 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] REGIONALISM: THE SECOND-BEST OPTION? 159 
Almost all of these agreements are to establish free trade areas.13  Free trade 
areas have two major characteristics that have implications for developing 
countries.  First, they allow the greatest flexibility with regard to design and 
content of the regional agreement due to the weak WTO/GATT institutional 
and rules-based discipline.14  What this means is that free trade agreements can 
be and are made to cover issues going well beyond trade in goods and services.  
In North-South agreements, this means that the developed country is in a 
position to demand that subjects of interest to it are covered at levels or to 
standards it desires.  Given the greater need of developing countries for the 
market access and possible investment that flow from such agreements, they 
have little leverage regarding the type or content of the additional disciplines 
sought.15  Second, since free trade areas entail the lowest level of economic 
 
replace the preference agreements with free trade agreements.  Id. at 58 n.9.  The EC recently 
completed the first of these agreements with the Cariforum, the Caribbean Forum. 
 13. As of January 2008, the United States has eleven free trade agreements with seventeen 
countries.  See Daniella Markheim, Free Trade Agreements: Promoting Prosperity in 2008, 2132 
BACKGROUNDER, May 2, 2008, at 1, 3, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/tradeand 
foreignaid/upload/bg_2132.pdf.  Only two of the free trade agreements the United States has 
pursued, have involved developed economies, Canada and Australia.  The EC has entered into 
free trade agreements throughout the world.  See European Commission, Overview of Bilateral 
Negotiations Involving Trade Agreements, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/ 
tradoc_118238.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).  To date, the EC has seven bilateral free trade 
agreements with developing countries (Algeria, Chile, Egypt, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, 
South Africa and Tunisia) and is conducting negotiations with countries throughout the Middle 
East and Africa.  Id. 
 14. The WTO requires member states which enter regional trade agreements to notify these 
to the organization.  The Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) has jurisdiction over 
these agreements.  The WTO agreed in 2006 to establish a review process for these agreements 
that would included a factual report about the operation of each regional trade agreement.  To 
date, the CRTA has made only limited progress on finalizing its reports.  WTO Director-General, 
World Trade Report 2007, 306 (2007) [hereinafter World Trade Report 2007], available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report07_e.pdf.  See Chi C. 
Carmody, Measurement and the Metrics of Regionalism: Experience with the WTO RTA 
Transparency Mechanism, 28 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 273 (2008) for an analysis of existing 
WTO oversight. 
  Historically, the GATT/WTO has never disapproved of a regional agreement.  
According to the Sutherland Report on the future of the World Trade Organization: “In practice 
there are now just too many WTO Members with interests in their own regional or bilateral 
arrangements for a critical review of PTA terms to take place and for consensus on their 
conformity to be found.”  Consultative Board to the Director-General, The Future of the WTO: 
Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium, 22, ¶ 77 (WTO 2004), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.pdf.  For a discussion of the rules 
regarding regionalism, see infra at note 21. 
 15. Frederick M. Abbott, A New Dominant Trade Species Emerges: Is Bilateralism a 
Threat?, 10 J. INT’L ECON L. 571, 578 (2007) (The author noted that the United States offers a 
template of the areas it wishes to cover and developing FTA partners do not have many 
possibilities for amending it.  Additionally, those countries which resisted the template, Brazil 
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integration,16 each participating state retains more sovereign power.  This 
factor plays out differently for developed and developing countries as well.  
The former have to make few, if any, major changes to their domestic policies 
to participate in free trade agreements.17  By contrast, the latter not only have 
major implementation obligations but also need to develop and fund 
complementary national policies to gain the greatest benefits from the FTA.18  
Such implementation costs could be eased with economic and technical 
assistance from the developed partner, but it cannot be demanded. 
I.  U.S. APPROACH TO THE “NEW REGIONALISM” 
During the last two administrations, the United States has developed a 
complete system of agreements for negotiating and enacting regional 
arrangements.  The components of this system—the Trade and Investment 
Framework Agreements (TIFAs),19 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs),20 
regional free trade initiatives21 and bilateral free trade agreements—cover the 
 
and Argentina in the FTAA negotiations, were left out and isolated when the United States began 
negotiations with other, more willing partners in Latin America.). 
 16. See generally BELA BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 2 (Richard D. 
Irwin, Inc., 1965) (1961) (defining free trade area and contrasting its limited demands with those 
required for the deeper forms of economic integration, customs unions and common markets). 
 17. The major implementation requirements for the United States are revising its tariff 
schedules and altering preference programs. 
 18. See infra notes 48–55 and accompanying text for a discussion of what developing 
country FTA partners must do to have successful FTAs with the United States. 
 19. The United States currently has thirty-three Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreements (TIFAs) in place.  USTR, Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs), 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/TIFA/Section_Index.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).  
TIFAs cover legal protections for investors, intellectual property issues, customs improvements, 
and transparency regarding government and commercial regulations.  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2005 
INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT – UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (2005).  These agreements are 
often used as precursors to bilateral free trade agreements for those countries that are part of a 
U.S. regional free trade initiative.  For example, the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI), 
which was aimed at the ASEAN countries of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, the United States offered free trade 
agreements committed to U.S. free trade goals.  USTR, Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative, 
[hereinafter EAI Background], http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/Enterprise_for_ 
ASEAN_Initiative/Section_Index.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2008). 
 20. The United States has over thirty-nine Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in place.  The 
United States uses a model BIT when it negotiates with partner countries.  See U.S. Department 
of State, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/ 
7treaty.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2008). 
 21. The United States has been involved in six initiatives that have aimed at creating either a 
regional or a series of bilateral free trade agreements: EAI, the Middle East Free Trade Area 
Initiative (MEFTAI), South African Customs Union Initiative (SACU), the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Central 
American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA).  Two of these initiatives, 
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two areas of greatest U.S. interest: trade in goods and services and investment.  
These different components have been used sequentially to prepare a country 
or a region for closer economic integration with the U.S. market.  TIFAs are 
used at the beginning of the process to set out the mutual goals of the United 
States and its partner countries on trade and investment.  If a country is willing 
to make firm investment commitments, it then signs a BIT or agrees to such 
disciplines as part of a free trade agreement.  The regional free trade initiatives, 
such as North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),22 Enterprise for 
ASEAN Initiative (EAI)23 and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA),24 
have been used to establish the overall U.S. goals regarding important trading 
regions of the world.  Current U.S. initiatives cover every major continent or 
region—Asia, Africa,25 Middle East, Latin America—except for Europe.  
Some of these initiatives have produced bilateral free trade agreements that 
have been enacted,26 while others provide a framework for a series of bilateral 
 
SACU and the FTAA, have been suspended.  Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, 
Report by U.S., WT/TPR/G/200, at 14, 15 (2008) [hereinafter US/TPR], available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/g200_e.doc.  All of the other regional efforts have 
produced existing free trade agreements (NAFTA, DR-CAFTA) or a combination of TIFAs and 
bilateral free trade agreements (EAI, MEFTAI).  Id. at 14–16. 
 22. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(containing chs. 1–9), 32 I.L.M. 605 (containing chs. 10–22) [hereinafter NAFTA], available at 
http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?DetailID=78. 
 23. See EAI Background, supra note 19. 
 24. All thirty-four leaders agreed to explore the possibility of a Free Trade Area.  US/TPR, 
supra note 21, at 14.  However, there was no agreement on the timing, and the FTAA 
negotiations remained suspended during 2006 and 2007.  Id.  According to the United States, that 
was because “other leaders indicated that conditions did not exist for the achievement of the 
FTAA.”  Id.  For a review of the issues that led to the suspension of the FTAA, see David A. 
Gantz, The Free Trade Area of the Americas: An Idea Whose Time Has Come—and Gone?, 1 
LOY. INT’L L. REV. 179 (2004).  For official materials on the FTAA, see the USTR webpage.  
USTR, Background Information on the U.S.-SACU FTA, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_ 
Agreements/Regional/FTAA/Section_Index.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2008). 
 25. The regional initiative here was with the South African Customs Union (SACU).  See 
generally USTR, Background Information on the U.S., http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/ 
Bilateral/Southern_Africa_FTA/Background_Information_on_the_US-SACU_FTA.html (last 
visited Aug. 31, 2008) (presenting background Information on the U.S.-SACU FTA).  These 
negotiations were launched in 2003, and the goal was to build on the success of the U.S. 
preference program for Africa, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).  Id.  Active 
negotiations were suspended in 2006 but remain a “longer term objective,” according to the 
United States.  US/TPR, supra note 21, at 15. 
 26. The DR-CAFTA initiative lead to the Central American-Dominican Republic-United 
States Free Trade Agreement.  DR-CAFTA, supra note 10.  The agreement has entered into force 
for the United States, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic.  
DR-CAFTA, supra note 10.  Costa Rica could not enact DR-CAFTA without a public 
referendum, which was held October 7, 2007.  ICT Chamber Outlines Benefits of FTA for IT 
Industry, BUSINESS NEW AMERICAS, Oct. 17, 2007 [hereinafter Business News Americas].  The 
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free trade agreements.27  Bilateral free trade agreements have come about 
either individually or as a part of the regional initiatives. 
Once the Bush administration received Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) 
from Congress28 to negotiate both multilateral and regional agreements, the 
United States accelerated both the pace of negotiations for and 
implementations of free trade agreements.  All of the major regional free trade 
initiatives were launched in 2002 and 2003.  Every year from 2003 to 2007, the 
United States completed, and Congress approved, at least one free trade 
agreement.29  With the exception of DR-CAFTA, all of these FTAs have been 
bilateral agreements.30  With the exception of Australia, all of these recent 
FTAs have been with developing countries. 
To fully understand what is new about this U.S. approach to regionalism 
requires an examination of the history of U.S. regionalism.  It is a relatively 
new history because the United States focused on multilateralism and 
unilateralism before the 1980s.31  The United States entered into only two free 
 
FTA was approved by the slimmest of margins (51.48% in favor to 48.42% against).  Costa Rica 
has had to request an extension of its March 2008 deadline to pass all of the implementing 
legislation needed to enact its free trade agreement obligations.  Costa Rica To Request Extension 
for Deadline To Enter CAFTA, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Vol. 26, No. 5, Feb. 1, 2008 [hereinafter 
Costa Rica Deadline]. 
  The EAI launched in 2002 produced the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement.  U.S.-
Singapore FTA, supra note 10.  The United States has also entered into negotiations with 
Malaysia and Thailand for bilateral free trade agreements.  US/TPR, supra note 21, at 20–22. 
 27. The Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative (MEFTA) launched in 2003 has produced 
three free trade agreements with Morocco, Bahrain and Oman.  U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra note 
10.  The U.S.-Bahrain FTA was enacted in the United States in 2006.  U.S.-Bahrain FTA, supra 
note 10.  The U.S.-Oman FTA was enacted in the United States in 2006.  U.S.-Oman FTA, supra 
note 10.  The goal is to create a Middle East Free Trade Area.  US/TPR, supra note 21, at 16. 
 28. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 993, 
(codified as 19 U.S.C. §§3801 (2002)) [hereinafter TPA]. 
 29. The pattern is as follows: U.S.-Singapore (2003), U.S.-Singapore FTA supra note 10; 
U.S.-Chile (2003), U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 
[hereinafter U.S.-Chile FTA], available at http://ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_ 
FTA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html; U.S.-Australia (2004), U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 10; 
U.S.-Morocco (2004), U.S-Morocco FTA, supra note 10;  U.S.-CAFTA/DR (2005), DR-CAFTA 
supra note 10; U.S.-Bahrain (2006), U.S.-Bahrain FTA supra note 10; U.S.-Oman (2006), U.S.-
Oman FTA supra note 9; and U.S.-Peru (2007) [hereinafter U.S.-Peru FTA], supra note 10. 
 30. Those bilaterals are: U.S.-Singapore FTA, supra note 10; U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 
29; U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 10; U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra note 10; U.S.-Bahrain FTA, 
supra note 10; U.S.-Oman FTA, supra note 10; U.S.-Peru FTA supra note 10. 
 31. See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, REGIONALISM AND MULTILATERALISM: AN OVERVIEW 3–26 
(Jagdish Bhagwati, Pravin Krishna & Arvind Panagariya eds., MIT 1999); JAGDISH BHAGWATI, 
THE WIND OF THE HUNDRED DAYS: HOW WASHINGTON MISMANAGED GLOBALIZATION 245–46 
(MIT 2002) (noting the long-standing U.S. preference for multilateralism); C. O’Neal Taylor, The 
Limits of Economic Power: Section 302 and the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement 
System, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 209, 209–242 (1997) (pointing out that although the United 
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trade agreements before the two most recent administrations: the U.S.-Israel 
FTA32 (enacted in 1985) and the U.S.-Canada FTA33 (enacted in 1988).  
During the Clinton administration, the United States enacted NAFTA in 199334 
but otherwise focused its energies on negotiations for an agreement to create a 
hemispheric Free Trade Area of the Americas.  The Clinton administration 
began informal bilateral talks with some of the countries35 that approached the 
United States about entering into free trade agreements (Jordan, Chile, 
Singapore and Australia).36  Deprived of the required negotiating authority to 
complete any agreements, however, the Clinton administration brought only 
one to fruition. 
When the succeeding Bush administration obtained that authority in 2002, 
it broadened the U.S. approach to regionalism and began to pursue some new 
regional trade initiatives (DR-CAFTA,37 Middle East Free Trade Area 
(MEFTA)38 and the South African Custom Union initiative (SCAU)39), 
continued the other regional effort (the FTAA) and began bilateral agreement 
negotiations all at the same time.  This move to expand U.S.-led regionalism 
 
States has long been a champion of multilateralism, it has also been an aggressive unilateralist in 
using its section 301 statute to push the world trading system into expanding the GATT 
disciplines to include intellectual property and services). 
 32. United States-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement, U.S.-Israel, Apr. 22, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 
653 [hereinafter U.S.-Israel FTA], available at http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/ 
All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005439.asp. 
 33. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can., Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 
[hereinafter U.S.-Canada FTA], available at http://wehner.tamu.edu/mgmt.www/NAFTA/fta/ 
complete.pdf. 
 34. NAFTA, supra note 22. 
 35. Once the United States announced that it would negotiate a free trade agreement with 
Mexico, there was a shift in the “status quo of trade relations” in the Americas.  Other countries 
in the region, which were also heavily trade dependent on the United States, were faced with 
trade diversion.  Many of these, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, approached the 
United States about free trade negotiations.  The United States encouraged the last four to form a 
regional group.  RICHARD E. BALDWIN, A DOMINO THEORY OF REGIONALISM 487–88 (MIT 
1999).  The United States did begin negotiations with Chile during the Clinton administration 
despite the lack of trade negotiating authority.  Susan G. Esserman, Proceeding of the Canada-
United States Law Institute Conference on Understanding Each Other Across the Larges 
Undefended Boder in History, Speaker, 31 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 11, 14 (2005).  Former USTR General 
Counsel Esserman noted that the United States resisted overtures from some countries like 
Singapore and Australia due to the small size of the trading relationship.  Id.  However, despite 
the lack of negotiating authority, the Clinton administration moved at the end to begin 
negotiations with some countries because of (1) the concern about the movement towards free 
trade agreements around the world and (2) the paralysis of the WTO.  Id. 
 36. Esserman, supra note 35, at 14. 
 37. See DR-CAFTA, supra note 10. 
 38. See US/TPR, supra notes 21, at 16. 
 39. Id. at 15. 
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was made to counter a similar focus on regionalism undertaken by the EC.40  
The first bilateral agreements completed and enacted were with those countries 
that had approached the Clinton administration: Jordan (2001), Chile (2003), 
Singapore (2003) and Australia (2004).  One regional trade initiative—to 
negotiate with friendly countries in the Middle East (MEFTA)—was 
successful in producing bilateral agreements with Morocco (enacted in 2004), 
Bahrain (enacted in 2005) and Oman (enacted in 2006).  Other regional 
initiatives, such as SACU and the FTAA, were not completed and have been 
suspended.  During and following the collapse of the FTAA negotiations, the 
Bush administration negotiated free trade agreements with Latin American 
countries—DR-CAFTA (enacted in 2005), Peru (enacted in 2007), Panama 
(signed 2007, but not yet enacted)41 and Colombia (signed 2007, but not yet 
enacted).42  One other major bilateral FTA with South Korea, KORUS,43 was 
also signed in 2007 but has not yet been approved by Congress.  Although 
TPA expired in 2007, the Bush administration pursued passage of these 
completed agreements.44 
II.  WHY REGIONALISM? 
What spurred the United States and its developing country FTA partners to 
pursue regionalism at this furious pace?  Given the differences in size and 
economic power between the parties, it stands to reason that the motivations 
are quite different.  For the United States, one factor is clearly not in play.  The 
United States has not chosen FTA partners due to the amount of trade involved 
as compared to total U.S. trade.  Aside from KORUS,45 none of the recently 
 
 40. Esserman, supra note 35, at 13–15.  Following NAFTA, other countries moved to pursue 
regionalism while the United States was constrained due to a lack of political consensus and the 
“political fall out” from NAFTA.  Id. at 13–14.  The Bush administration, by contrast, made free 
trade agreements the “vehicle of choice” for promoting trade liberalization and began accelerating 
negotiations to make up lost ground.  Id. at 15. 
 41. U.S.-Panama FTA, supra note 10. 
 42. U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 10. 
 43. KORUS, supra note 10. 
 44. Trade Promotion Authority expired in July 2007.  Despite this, the Bush administration 
made approval of the pending FTAs with Colombia, Panama and South Korea its top priority.  
2008 TRADE POLICY AGENDA, supra note 10, at 2–3.  See also Statement of the U.S. Trade 
Representative Susan C. Schwab, Senate Fin. Comm., 110th Cong. (Mar. 6, 2008), available at 
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2008test/030608sstest.pdf (setting out the goal of 
passing the pending FTAs before reaching a conclusion in the Doha Round of the WTO). 
 45. The pending FTA would cover more trade any other FTA except for NAFTA.  Jeffrey J. 
Schott, The Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: A Summary Assessment, PETERSON INST. FOR 
INT’L ECONOMICS, Aug. 2007, at 1–2, available at http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/ 
pb/pb07-7.pdf.  If enacted, the agreement would account for 3% of total U.S. trade.  U.S. GOVT 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), GAO-08-59, INTERNATIONAL TRADE:  AN ANALYSIS OF FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENTS AND CONGRESSIONAL AND PRIVATE SECTOR CONSULTATION UNDER 
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enacted or pending FTAs have been with a major trading partner.  Altogether, 
the existing and pending U.S. free trade agreements account for only sixteen 
percent of total U.S. trade and sixteen percent of total investment.46  What 
matters to the United States is not having a large-market FTA partner but 
rather having an FTA partner with open markets.  For the United States, it is 
far more important to continue developing its model FTA47—one that will 
satisfy its commercial and, more importantly, its trade policy goals.  The 
United States views FTAs as laboratories for adding new subject areas and 
disciplines to the world trading system.48 
Due to its market size and power, the United States has had the freedom to 
develop what amounts to a free trade agreement strategy.  This strategy began 
with a careful consideration of which countries should be pursued for FTAs.  
By 2002, the U.S. Trade Representative employed a thirteen-factor list49 to 
decide which free trade agreements to pursue.  These factors centered around 
 
TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY 22 (2007) [hereinafter GAO 2007 REPORT], available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0859.pdf (based on data from 2005/2006). 
 46. GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 45, at 20. 
 47. In its review of how the Bush administration has consulted over free trade agreements 
entered into under Trade Promotion Authority, the GAO interviewed the officials responsible for 
trade policy and negotiations at USTR and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, 
State and Treasury, the agencies which, along with USTR, form an interagency group to propose 
potential FTA partners for the President.  Id. at 1–2.  As part of its analysis of the U.S. FTAs, the 
GAO examined the U.S. strategy for pursuing FTAs and found it had two major elements—using 
the theory of competitive liberalization and seeking comprehensive or “gold standard” bilateral 
and regional FTAs.  Id. at 17–18.  According to the GAO, the recent U.S. FTAs “have a number 
of absolute requirements, based on the model USTR seeks to use.”  Id. at 18.  In its Trade Policy 
Review Report to the WTO, the United States also noted that its regional trade agreements could 
“become models for future liberalization in new areas such as agriculture, services, investment, 
and labor standards.”  US/TPR, supra note 21, at 14. 
 48. USTR, THE PRESIDENT’S U.S. TRADE POLICY AGENDA FOR 2003 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2003/2003_Trade_Policy_A
genda/asset_upload_file666_6142.pdf (stating that the regional and bilateral FTAs promote the 
broader trade agenda by “serving as models, breaking new negotiating ground, and setting high 
standards”). 
 49. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO-04-233, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: 
INTENSIFYING FREE TRADE NEGOTIATING AGENDA CALLS FOR BETTER ALLOCATION OF STAFF 
AND RESOURCES 7–9 (2004) [hereinafter GAO 2004 REPORT], available at http://www.gao. 
gov/new.items/d04233.pdf. The thirteen factors were: (1) congressional guidance; (2) business 
and agricultural interest; (3) special product sensitivities; (4) serious political will of the 
prospective partner to undertake needed trade reforms; (5) willingness to implement other 
reforms; (6) commitment to WTO and other trade agreements; (7) contribution to regional 
integration; (8) support of civil society groups; (9) cooperation in security and foreign policy; 
(10) need to counter FTAs that place U.S. commercial interests at a disadvantage; (11) need to do 
FTAs in each of the world’s major regions; (12) need to ensure a mix of developed and 
developing countries; and (13) demand on USTR resources.  According to USTR, these factors 
did not have relative weights.  Id. at 7. 
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issues that have been pivotal ever since: domestic political support for FTA,50 
the level of commitment by target countries to trade liberalization and 
reform,51 the cooperation of target countries in security and foreign policy 
matters,52 and strategic plans to counter other trading nations.53  Several 
 
 50. Factors 1–3 are on congressional guidance, business and agricultural interest and special 
product sensitivities.  According to the GAO’s interview with USTR, it “consults with the 
Congress before and after FTA selection to ensure support and eventual congressional approval.” 
Id.  Additionally, USTR officials also examine public support, particularly from business and 
agricultural interests, and assess how the FTA will affect certain sectors, such as textiles and 
sugar, that have been of interest.  Id. 
  The Executive Branch rarely moves forward if there is political opposition.  See Gantz, 
supra note 24, at 187 (“Even the most free trade oriented administrations. . . are not likely to 
brave domestic political opposition unless there is enormous pressure from the business 
community to move forward and some semblance of bipartisan support in Congress.”). 
 51. Factors 4–6—the political will of potential FTA partners to implement trade reform and 
other reforms—deal with whether the FTA partner is willing to undertake obligations inherent in 
a U.S.-led FTA.  GAO 2004 REPORT, supra note 49, at 7–8.  Since USTR regards FTAs as a 
“development tool,” it is crucial that the FTA partner be willing to put in place other economic 
reforms.  Id.  In choosing an FTA partner, USTR tries to make sure that the country understands 
“(1) how important it is to make this commitment to reform and (2) the extent of the obligations 
that a comprehensive FTA with the U.S. involves.”  Id. at 8. 
  An example of the type of other reforms undertaken by FTA partners were those taken 
by Chile to eliminate price controls and privatize state-owned enterprises.  Id. at 42. 
  Factor 7, contribution to regional integration, is a recognition that bilateral FTAs can be 
an important part of U.S. regional free trade initiatives.  Id. at 8. 
 52. There is a direct link between being considered for an FTA and a country’s support for 
U.S. security and foreign policy goals.  USTR noted that the countries selected for bilaterals 
under MEFTAI were supporters of the U.S. objectives in the Middle East and that “CAFTA 
nations supported U.S. objectives in Iraq.”  Id. at 8.  See also Craig Van Grasstek, U.S. Trade 
Policy and Developing Countries: Free Trade Agreements, Trade Preferences, and the Doha 
Round, INT’L CENTRE FOR SUSTAINABLE TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, Information Note 4, Feb. 
2008, at 7, available at http://www.latn.org.ar/archivos/documentacion/PAPER_DOCop-71.pdf.  
Van Grasstek points out that the Bush administration has a narrow set of foreign policy goals: 
largely supporting the U.S. policy in the Middle East, cooperating in anti-narcotic activity and 
agreeing to leave the developing country coalition at the WTO (the Group of 21).  Id.  He also 
notes that FTAs were entered into moderate Middle East States and that, of the recent FTAs 
(including those not yet enacted), every partner country (S. Korea, Colombia, Panama and DR-
CAFTA states) was a member of the “coalition of the willing,” except for Guatemala.  Id. at 7 
n.5.  Chile and the DR-CAFTA countries were chosen as FTA partners in part because of their 
support for the U.S. positions in the FTAA negotiations.  GAO 2004 REPORT, supra note 49, at 
42–43, 52. 
 53. Factor 10—countering FTAs that place the U.S. commercial interests at a 
disadvantage—deals with one of the realities of the proliferation of regional agreements.  GAO 
2004 REPORT, supra note 49, at 8. Once competing trading nations begin to enter their own free 
trade agreements with a potential partner, the United States would be at a disadvantage.  This was 
the primary reason the United States entered into the U.S.-Chile FTA.  USTR noted that given 
Chile’s other FTAs (with Canada, Mexico and the EU), Chile had reduced its purchases of U.S. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] REGIONALISM: THE SECOND-BEST OPTION? 167 
bilateral free trade agreement negotiations and initiatives—Australia, Morocco, 
CAFTA and SACU—began after consideration of the thirteen-factor list.54  
Two years later, in 2004, the National Security Council55 (NSC) shortened the 
list of factors to six criteria that should be used as guidelines for the 
interagency process led by USTR, which chooses target countries.  These six 
factors—(1) country readiness, (2) economic and commercial benefit, (3) 
benefits to the broader liberalization strategy, (4) compatibility with U.S. 
interests, (5) congressional/private sector support and (6) U.S. government 
resource constraints56—have been used for the more recent FTA agreements. 
Even the narrowed list of criteria has been drawn broadly enough to allow 
the U.S. administration great discretion in choosing FTA partners.57  
Nevertheless, the actual choice of FTA partners reveals that some criteria 
clearly have been weighed more heavily than others.  Perceived and 
anticipated congressional and private sector support is crucial for beginning 
successful negotiations that will lead to the approval and implementation.  
Since the Executive Branch cannot make trade policy independently, this 
limitation actually poses a greater restraint on the United States than the 
negotiating leverage of any FTA partner.58  Although Congress does not have a 
 
exports by almost one-third.  Id. at 42, 44 (noting that the United States lost export market share 
in Chile due to its other FTAs). 
 54. Id. at 2, 11–12. 
 55. The NSC is on the highest tier interagency trade group that aids USTR.  Id. at 4–5.  The 
NSC coordinates the views of the agencies regarding FTA partner selection.  Id. at 7. 
 56. Id. at 9–10; GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 45, at 12.  According to USTR, the first 
factor, country readiness, involves a “country’s political will, trade capabilities, and rule of law 
systems.”  GAO 2004 REPORT, supra note 49, at 9.  The interagency review done to review FTA 
partners means that different U.S. agencies examine different issues when evaluating a partner 
under this factor.  Id. at 9.  USTR examines trade policy issues while the Treasury Department 
looks at a potential FTA partner’s “overall macroeconomic stability and the strength of its 
financial and banking systems.”  Id. 
  The sixth factor, U.S. government constraints, deals primarily with the constraints at 
USTR, such as its ability to staff negotiations.  GAO 2004 REPORT, supra note 49, at 10.  This 
issue has become more pressing as the United States accelerated FTA negotiations to meet the 
TPA time line for submission for Congress’s approval. 
 57. GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 45, at 12. 
 58. Congress shares trade-making authority with the President under the Constitution.  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8 cls. 1, 3 (Congress has the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and 
Excises” and to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”).  Any trade agreement negotiated by 
the President must be approved by Congress.  In the modern era, this has meant that Congress 
delegated its authority to the President to negotiate trade agreements and then return them for 
approval.  The process, called “fast track,” is so called because any trade agreement submitted to 
Congress under this delegation will be voted on quickly and without amendment.  See C. O’Neal 
Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: Why the NAFTA Turned Into a 
Battle, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 1, 15–32 (1994) (providing a detailed history of the 
fast track and the shared power relationship between Congress and the Executive). The most 
recent version of fast track (renamed Trade Promotion Authority) was enacted in 2002, and it 
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direct voice in the selection of FTA partners, it is not in the interest of any 
administration to pursue a free trade agreement that will not garner the 
necessary votes under the TPA.59  Congress guarantees that their approval will 
be a large part of any decision on FTA partners through several mechanisms 
either contained in the TPA or developed as standard practice.  Congress 
dictates the negotiating objectives the Executive must pursue in any regional 
agreement.60  Congress requires notification before the commencement of 
negotiations and consultation during the negotiations with the FTA partners,61 
as well as post-negotiation consultations on areas of interest that can result in 
alterations to negotiated and signed agreements.62  Congress also shares 
drafting powers over the implementing legislation for each free trade 
agreement with the Executive. 
 
expired in 2007.  All of the recent enacted and pending FTAs were negotiated under the terms of 
the TPA. 
 59. See Esserman, supra note 35, at 15 (noting that the most important factor in selecting 
which FTAs to negotiate has been the need to get the necessary votes in the House of 
Representatives—“the need to secure 218 votes is the overriding determinant”).  Both the House 
and Senate vote on trade agreements, but with its power over the budget, it is the House vote that 
comes first, which is, therefore, crucial.  This also means that a trade agreement can become a 
very political issue if it means potential loss of U.S. jobs through import competition.  This was a 
major factor in NAFTA and in DR-CAFTA.  Id. at 17. 
 60. In the TPA of 2002, Congress identified pages for both overall trade negotiating 
objectives and principal trade negotiating objectives.  The principle trade negotiating objectives 
were (1) trade barriers and distortions; (2) trade in services; (3) foreign investment; (4) 
intellectual property; (5) transparency; (6) anti-corruption; (7) improvement of the WTO and 
multilateral trade agreements; (8) regulatory practices; (9) electronic commerce; (10) reciprocal 
trade in agriculture; (11) labor and the environment; (12) dispute settlement and enforcement; 
(13) WTO extended negotiations; (14) trade remedy laws; (15) border taxes; (16) textile 
negotiations; and (17) worst forms of child labor.  TPA, supra note 28, at 994–1002. 
 61. Before negotiations, the President must notify Congress in writing of the intent to enter 
into negotiations, consult both before and after with the principal Congressional Committees with 
trade oversight (House Ways and Means and Senate Finance) and conduct consultations over 
areas of special concerns—sensitive agricultural products, the fishing industry, and textiles.  TPA, 
supra note 28, at 1008–10.  During negotiations and before entering into any free trade 
agreements, the President must also consult with Congress and submit to Congress reports of the 
private sector advisory committees (which review free trade agreement) and notify the 
International Trade Commission (ITC) so that it can conduct an assessment of the agreement.  
TPA, supra note 28, at 1010, 1012–13. 
 62. During this time frame, the President must submit to Congress a description of changes 
that would be required to existing U.S. law, a final legal text of the agreement, draft of the 
implementing legislation and a statement of administrative actions about the agreement.  TPA, 
supra note 28, at 1013.  In practice, the President and Congress work together on the 
implementing legislation.  It is in this process that issues come up that are dealt with by side 
agreements and side letters.  See CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY 
(TPA): ISSUES, OPTIONS, AND PROSPECTS FOR RENEWAL 13 (2007), available at 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl33743.pdf (noting that Congress insists on additions 
or clarifications to trade agreements by this process). 
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In order to meet these congressional expectations, USTR only negotiated 
FTAs that have each congressional negotiating objective covered by a separate 
standard chapter of the agreement.63  In addition to the need for congressional 
support, several other major motivations underlie how the NSC criteria are 
used.  The most important of these motivations are (1) to pursue “competitive 
liberalization”; (2) to satisfy particular foreign policy and objectives; (3) to 
convert preference trading partners into reciprocal trade partners; and (4) to 
push the well-developed U.S. agenda on deep integration issues. 
“Competitive liberalization” is the preferred strategy for dealing with 
lagging multilateral efforts.  The strategy was developed to deal with a 
multilateral system incapable of rapid movement.  The WTO has a process of 
consensus decision making in negotiating rounds and a much larger 
membership (over 150 countries), including various coalitions of member 
states pushing difficult agendas.  Although the United States plays a leading 
role in all negotiations, it cannot direct the agenda.  Under the competitive 
liberalization strategy, the United States pursues multiple free trade initiatives 
simultaneously at the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels.  Engaging fully 
in levels other than the multilateral allows the United States to create “models 
for success in areas” of trade negotiation and provides leverage with each new 
agreement obtained.64  If trade liberalization proves unavailable or incomplete 
at the multilateral level, successful competition from another level—much 
easier to negotiate and complete—should spur greater progress or provide an 
alternative.65  More recently, the United States has shifted to describing the 
strategy as “complementary liberalization,” characterizing the multilateral and 
regional efforts as mutually reinforcing ones.66 
A simple review of the enacted and pending U.S. FTAs illustrates the 
importance of the second motivation for the aggressive pursuit of 
regionalism—to achieve foreign policy and national security objectives.67  
 
 63. GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 45, at 18–19. 
 64. “Competitive liberalization” is the terminology adopted by former U.S. Trade 
Representative Zoellick to describe the U.S. strategy. 
  “By pursuing multiple free trade initiatives, the United States has created a ‘competition 
for liberalization,’ launching new global trade negotiations, providing leverage to spur new 
negotiations and solve problems, and establishing models of success in areas such as intellectual 
property, e-commerce, environment and labor and anti-corruption.”  USTR, THE PRESIDENT’S 
2005 TRADE POLICY AGENDA 1 (2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/ 
Reports_Publications/2005/2005_Trade_Policy_Agenda/Section_Index.html. 
 65. GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 45, at 17. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Of the recent FTAs, three, those with Morocco, Bahrain and Omar, were negotiated with 
foreign policy and national security as the dominant motivation.  Id. at 1; GAO 2004 REPORT, 
supra note 49, at 40 (noting the reason for choosing Bahrain was that it was an “important U.S. 
ally in the region” and would support “U.S. security and political goals”); id. at 47 (describing 
Morocco as “a staunch ally in the war against terrorism”). 
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Following September 11, 2001, widespread consensus existed within the 
Executive and Legislative Branches for pursuing closer relationships with 
moderate Muslim countries.  The MEFTA initiative, which began in 2003, and 
the consequent bilaterals negotiated under it satisfy a key national security 
concern.  More particularized foreign policy goals are met by the choice of 
Panama (security of the Canal Zone) and South Korea (to offset U.S. policy 
towards N. Korea).  Another explicit foreign policy concern is to encourage 
countries—particularly the Andean countries overly reliant on the drug trade—
to refocus their economies.  Another type of foreign policy goal has been to 
encourage trade and governance reform in developing countries. 
A third motivation has been to convert countries participating in preference 
programs allowing duty-free access into the U.S. market—such as the General 
System of Preferences (GSP), the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and the 
Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA)68—into countries offering the 
reciprocal market access required in free trade agreements.  For example, all of 
the countries participating in DR-CAFTA as well as Peru, Panama and 
Colombia have already or will relinquish preference status as part of negotiated 
FTAs.  All of these developing countries have relatively high tariff walls and 
many other non-tariff barriers.  Since any U.S.-negotiated FTA will cover 
“substantially all trade,”69 the United States stands to gain complete access in 
its developing partners’ market more fully and more quickly.70 
 
 68. The Generalized System of Preferences is the largest U.S. preference program—it allows 
developing countries duty-free access to the U.S. market GSP for thousands of products from 
over 100 designated beneficiary countries.  USTR, A GUIDE TO THE U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM 
OF PREFERENCES 3 (2006), available at http://regulations.justia.com/view/48713.  The current 
version, which has been enacted multiple times, expired at the end of 2008.  The Caribbean Basis 
Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), 19 U.S.C. § 2702 (2000), was first passed in 1983 and 
expanded in 2000 and 2002 to help countries in the area access the U.S. market.  2008 TRADE 
POLICY AGENDA, supra note 10, at 130.  The Andean Trade Preference Act, Pub. L. No. 102-182, 
105 Stat. 1233, 1236 (1991), was passed to aid the Andean countries in their efforts to develop 
and spur regional economic development “to provide economic alternatives to the illegal drug 
trade, promote domestic development, and thereby solidify democratic institutions.”  2008 TRADE 
POLICY AGENDA, supra note 10, at 129. 
 69. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, art. XXIV(8)(b), 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 
(1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/06-
gatt.pdf (According to Article XXIV of the GATT, any free trade agreement must cover 
“substantially all the trade.”). 
 70. U.S. free trade agreements are designed to eliminate tariffs on almost all trade between 
the participating countries.  By contrast, WTO members are committed in negotiating rounds only 
to lowering tariffs and binding them.  As a result, a developing country in a U.S. FTA would have 
to work toward duty-free access for the United States but could keep fairly high tariffs to other 
WTO members.  The ability to exploit this difference—raising tariffs to the outside while not 
doing so to an FTA partner—was used by Mexico to help it with the peso crisis that followed the 
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A final, but no less important, motivation informing the choice of FTA 
partners has been to push the U.S. agenda on deep integration issues.  The 
United States pioneered the concept of adding new subjects and rules to free 
trade agreements with the U.S.-Canada FTA and NAFTA and has pursued 
such a model ever since.  With limited exceptions, all U.S. FTAs require 
comprehensive trade in services coverage, extensive protection of intellectual 
property rights and government procurement.  By including the first two areas 
and expanding their reach in each, the United States extends gains achieved in 
the Uruguay Round,71 when both areas were placed under WTO jurisdiction.  
By contrast, the inclusion of government procurement as a covered FTA 
subject allows the United States to obtain much greater market access to a 
large amount of trade currently available under the WTO rules.72  The U.S. 
model FTA also covers issues that have been rejected or resisted by the WTO.  
Almost every U.S. FTA contains chapters on investment rights (including 
neutral arbitration to protect such rights),73 and most cover competition law.74  
 
adoption of NAFTA.  BHAGWATI, THE WIND OF THE HUNDRED DAYS, supra note 31, at 231–32 
(expressing skepticism about the idea that PTAs “lock in” trade reform). 
  The tariffs in a free trade agreement are phased out over time in U.S. agreements from 
immediate elimination up to twenty years.  The United States, however, always negotiates 
agreements so that as large a proportion possible of trade is duty-free prior to ten years.  For 
example, the United States was able to set that 85% of all trade be freed up immediately and 90% 
of all trade within four years of the entry into force of the U.S.-Chile FTA.  U.S. INT’L TRADE 
COMMISSION (ITC), PUB. NO. 3780, THE IMPACT OF TRADE AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTED 
UNDER TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY 2–12 (2005) [hereinafter ITC IMPACT REPORT]. 
  By contrast, recent WTO negotiating rounds take years to complete.  The Uruguay 
Round took from eight years (1986–1994), while the Doha Round is in year seven (2001–present) 
without any indication of an end date. 
 71. The United States led the push to get trade services and intellectual property onto the 
Uruguay Round agenda against the opposition of developing countries.  See Taylor, supra note 
31, at 220–37.  When the Uruguay Round ended, the World Trade Organization had been created 
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and Trade-Related Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) were made part of the obligations of all members.  General Agreement on Trade 
in Services, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 108 
Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS], available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1C , 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 269, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1125 
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]; available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf. 
 72. The Agreement on Government Procurement is a plurilateral agreement of the WTO.  
Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 4(b), 19 U.N.T.S. 103, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gpr-94_e.pdf.  Member states can choose 
whether or not to accede to the agreement.  As a result, it has a much smaller membership, 
approximately 40 countries as opposed to the 150 Members of the WTO. 
 73. Every recent U.S. FTA, except for those with Jordan, Australia and Bahrain, cover 
investment.  See U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 10.  The United States and Jordan concluded a 
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Each of these FTA chapters cover the areas of greatest U.S. comparative 
advantage (trade in services, creation of intellectual property thus benefiting 
from IP rights, investment capacity), is built around U.S.-level standards (IP 
rights,75 investment rights, government procurement procedures), or both. 
Why do developing countries pursue regional agreements with the United 
States?  In the last two decades, it has become clear that regionalism accounts 
for a growing portion of world trade.76  No developing country seeking 
economic growth and development can stay outside this major pattern of world 
trade.  Virtually every member of the WTO is a member of one or more 
regional agreements.77  Consequently, the first rationale for seeking a regional 
agreement is to avoid isolation and to enter or ease entry problems with 
globalization.78 
The second major rationale is more obvious but no less important.  Many 
of the agreements developing countries pursue are truly within their own 
geographic region and constitute a necessary attempt to build on and increase 
traditional trade and investment flows.  If the closest countries are other 
developing countries, they enter South-South agreements to build greater 
strength and efficiency as a group.  If the major market of the developing 
country is a developed market such as the United States, however, that country 
becomes the logical FTA partner.  Most of the developing countries that have 
completed an FTA already have the United States as their major export 
market.79  Each of these countries, therefore, has had the chance to analyze the 
actual benefits and costs of a U.S. FTA entered into by a country with similar 
 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) in 1997 that entered into force in 2003.  Bahrain had entered 
into a BIT with the United States prior to the FTA.  The U.S.-Australia FTA lacks mandatory 
investor-state arbitration but does contain standards for the treatment of investors.  See U.S.-
Australia FTA, supra note 10. 
 74. Competition law chapters have not been included in all recent agreements.  There are no 
chapters on this subject area in the FTAs with Jordan, Morocco, DR-CAFTA, Bahrain, Oman and 
Panama. 
 75. See infra notes 128–135 and accompanying text for a discussion on how the United 
States pushes for an intellectual property chapter built on U.S. standards. 
 76. Regionalism now accounts for over 50% of world trade.  UNCTAD, MULTILATERALISM 
AND REGIONALISM: THE NEW INTERFACE, UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/2004/7, at 3 (2005), 
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditctncd20047_en.pdf. 
 77. According to the WTO, every member state except Mongolia is a member of a regional 
trade arrangement.  World Trade Report 2007, supra note 14, at 34. 
 78. Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 38. 
 79. This is true for all of the U.S. FTAs with countries in Latin America.  These countries 
send a far greater proportion of their exports to the United States than to one another—only 
13.2% of Latin exports went to other Latin American countries.  Nathalie Aminican, K.C. Fung & 
Francis Ng, Integration of Markets vs. Integration by Agreements 19–21 (The World Bank 
Development Research Group Trade Team Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4546 , 2008), 
available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2008/ 
03/04/000158349_20080304084358/Rendered/PDF/wps4546.pdf. 
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goals and constraints.  In this sense, Mexico’s experience with the United 
States in NAFTA has provided a model for other developing countries to 
study.80 
The United States is the world’s largest market.  Most developing 
countries already have what appears to be access to this market through 
relatively low tariffs and highly developed preference programs.  But this 
market access is neither complete—not every export of interest to all 
developing countries are covered by low tariffs or preference programs—nor 
secure since all preference programs have to be renewed periodically and are 
always altered upon renewal.  By entering into a permanent FTA with the 
United States,81 the developing countries gain secure and true duty-free access.  
In its most recent FTAs, the United States has front-loaded its own tariff 
phase-outs in industrial goods and many agricultural goods as well to put 
developing countries in a position to benefit early from signing on to an FTA.82  
Developing countries that act early to form an FTA with a developed country 
may also obtain first-mover benefits.83  In the case of U.S. FTAs, this means 
 
 80. Mexico does provide a model of what can happen to a developing country entering into a 
free trade agreement with a major developed trading nation.  Mexico has clearly seen increase in 
trade and investment flows.  Without NAFTA, Mexico’s global exports would have been 25% 
lower and investment levels would have been 40% lower.  DANIEL LEDERMAN, WILLIAM F. 
MALONEY & LUIS SERVEN, LESSONS FROM NAFTA FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARRIBBEAN COUNTRIES 5 (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The 
World Bank, eds., Stanford University Press 2005) [hereinafter LESSONS FROM NAFTA], 
available at http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/geograph/north/lessonsNAFTA_e.pdf.  Nevertheless, it is 
clear that Mexico has not shown the economic growth expected from NAFTA nor as fast as other 
Latin American Countries without an FTA.  Id. at vi.  See infra at notes 84–91 and accompanying 
text for a more complete discussion of issues related to Mexico’s experience under NAFTA.  See 
also Ranko Shakri Oliver, In the Twelve Years of NAFTA, the Treaty Gave to Me . . . What, 
Exactly?: An Assessment of the Economic, Social and Political Development in Mexico Since 
1994 and their Impact on Mexican Immigration into the United States, 10 HARV. LATINO L. REV 
53, 57 (2007) (pointing out the need to study NAFTA and its effects on Mexico because it is the 
prototype for other agreements within countries in the Western Hemisphere at a similar level of 
development). 
 81. Every U.S. FTA provides the parties with the right to withdraw from the agreement 
within six months if it provides notice of withdraw to the other parties.  See NAFTA, supra note 
22, art. 2205.  However, it would be quite costly for parties to withdrawal, and that option has 
never been seriously considered by any FTA partner. 
 82. For illustrations, see the recent FTA with DR-CAFTA—more than 90% of trade in 
consumer and industrial goods and half of the agricultural trade were liberalized early.  DR-
CAFTA, supra note 10. 
 83. This was widely perceived to be the case of Mexico in NAFTA.  See Global Economic 
Prospects, Trade, Regionalism and Development (The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 2005), 
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP2005/Resources/gep2005.pdf.  In the case 
of DR-CAFTA, the countries negotiated over the rules of origin to set the most flexible market 
access conditions available in the textiles sector,one that is still relatively restricted.  Central 
America Dept. and Office of the Chief Economist Latin America and Carribbean Region, DR-
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negotiating special rules of origin for products of interest to the developing 
country or group that will give it a preferential position over other developing 
countries trying to enter the U.S. market. 
The third major objective of the developing country is to attract more 
foreign direct investment.  Signing on to major investment rights and providing 
the assurance of neutral arbitration regarding any infringement of those rights 
signals to investors that a country is a credible and secure investment target.  
One of the major consequences of NAFTA for Mexico was a great increase in 
investment flows.84  Developing countries looking to attract a greater share of 
investment hope to duplicate this pattern by acceding to a U.S.-style FTA, just 
as they have by signing BITs with the United States, the EC and Japan.85  One 
aspect of the investment chapters in the U.S. FTAs provides an additional 
incentive for developing countries to pursue the agreement.  In each chapter, 
“investment” is defined to cover all investments made in the FTA party 
regardless of the country of origin of the investor.  Although barred from 
benefits under trade provisions of the FTA, non-member country firms can 
take advantage of the investment protections and investment arbitration by 
investing in a party to the free trade agreement. 
The fourth motivation for negotiating and implementing an FTA is to “lock 
in” domestic reforms in the areas of trade and investment policy and 
governance.86  Many countries that are developing have undertaken unilateral 
or regional trade investment liberalization before entering into an FTA with the 
United States.  A clear example is the reform efforts undertaken throughout 
Latin America in the last fifteen years.87  Such reforms, however, may not be 
permanent.  Succeeding political regimes sometimes have overturned reform 
 
CAFTA: Challenges and Opportunities for Central America 39–41 [hereinafter DR-CAFTA 
Report], available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/LACEXT/Resources/258553-11196487 
63980/DR_CAFTA_Challenges_Opport_Final_en.pdf. 
 84. See infra at note 159 and accompanying text. 
 85. See generally Andeas Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International Law, 42 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 123, 126 (2003) (discussing the rationales for entering BITs); Jeswald 
W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 67, 77 (2005) (describing the 
bargain as “a promise of protection in return for the prospect of more capital in the future” and 
explaining that the study reveals the bargain has worked). 
 86. One of the major motivations for Mexico entering NAFTA was to “lock in” domestic 
reforms it had made in the investment and intellectual property rights.  In DR-CAFTA, the 
countries were seeking that same benefit.  DR-CAFTA Report, supra note 83, at 29–32 (“For 
many Central American nations, locking many of the reforms of recent years with an FTA that is 
costly to violate should generate a credibility effect that could boost investment levels.”). 
 87. All of the DR-CAFTA countries engaged in trade reform during this period, lowering 
tariffs and some developed a maquila industry aimed at the United States.  One of the goals of the 
FTA was to build on the reform because it would guarantee long-term market access to the 
United States and lock in its reforms.  Id. 
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legislation and have withdrawn from regional arrangements.88  Withdrawal 
from a U.S. FTA is possible but unlikely.  The benefits from the agreement, as 
well the close contact established with the United States to consolidate those 
benefits, make withdrawal too costly.89  If negotiations last long enough, the 
developing country might have time to adapt its domestic legislation in certain 
regulatory areas to correspond to FTA requirements—thus easing the 
adjustment process—before the FTA enters into force.  Mexico, for instance, 
used the NAFTA negotiations process to not only lock in pro-market reforms 
but to pass major legislation reforming its investment and intellectual property 
laws.90 
A final motivation for entering an FTA with the United States is that it 
may spur or assist with other integration efforts.  Organizing a regional 
integration movement among developing countries may be a crucial step in 
aiding a country’s economic growth.  However, such South-South agreements 
frequently fail, due to difficulties in implementation, to provide as much 
liberalization or opportunity for growth as expected.91  By entering into a U.S. 
FTA, the developing country and its group have a target for the group’s trade 
expansion that would make efforts worthwhile. 
III.  WHAT KIND OF REGIONALISM? 
The U.S. answer to the question of what type of regionalism is easy to 
explain.  The United States only enters into free trade agreements that satisfy 
its model.  The free trade agreement is the U.S.-favored form of regionalism 
for three reasons.  First, there are only limited multilateral requirements for 
free trade agreements, and these are relatively easy to satisfy.  Second, setting 
up a free trade area requires only the most limited level of integration with 
FTA partners.  Third, the combination of the limited legal rules and the limited 
 
 88. Most recently, the Andean Community, a customs union, broke apart after two members, 
Peru and Colombia, negotiated FTAs with the United States.  Under the terms of the regional 
arrangement, these countries had the right to negotiate independently with third-party countries, 
regions or international organizations.  Nevertheless, when the two countries went ahead with the 
negotiations, Venezuela withdrew from the group and joined MERCOSUR.  See Chris Brummer, 
The Ties that Bind? Regionalism, Commercial Treaties, and the Future of Global Economic 
Integration, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1349, 1380–81, 1384–86 (2007). 
 89. Every U.S. FTA sets up a committee structure for the operation of the agreement.  The 
FTA committees meet on a regular basis to resolve issues regarding implementation of the tariff 
phase-outs, standards issues and, in recent FTAs, trade capacity building. 
 90. Mexico’s investment law was revised in 1993.  Its revised intellectual property law was 
enacted in 1991—both prior to the entry into force of NAFTA. 
 91. See Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 110–11 for a discussion of 
South-South agreements and how they should be used.  See also Globalization for Development, 
supra note 11, at 8. 
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level of required integration allows the United States the greatest flexibility 
and control in designing the agreement and its contents. 
In order to comply with the WTO, members should enter into only those 
free trade agreements that satisfy the requirements under GATT Article XXIV: 
(1) to eliminate duties and other restrictive regulations on substantially all trade 
between constituent territories originating in those territories; (2) not to raise 
duties or other restrictive regulations against non-members upon formation of 
the free trade area; and (3) to achieve these objectives within a reasonable 
period of time.92  There are similar requirements regarding agreements on trade 
in services under GATS Article V.93  The requirements under both legal rules 
 
 92. GATT 1994, supra note 69, art. XXIV, ¶ 5(b). 
With respect to a free-trade area . . . the duties and other regulations of commerce 
maintained in each of the constituent territories and applicable at the formation of such 
free-trade area . . . shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding duties 
and other regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent territories prior to the 
formation of the free-trade area.   
Id. 
(8)  For purposes of this Agreement: 
. . . .  
(b)  a free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs 
territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce ... are 
eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products 
originating in such territories.   
Id. art. XXIV, ¶ 8(b).  Article XXIV, thus, intended to allow regional arrangements “as long as 
they satisfied three requirements: transparency, commitment to deep—intra regional 
liberalization, and neutrality vis-à-vis third parties.”  World Trade Report 2007, supra note 14, at 
305. 
 93. GATS, supra note 71, art. V: 
1. This Agreement shall not prevent any of its Members from being a party to or 
entering into an agreement liberalizing trade in services between or among the parties 
to such an agreement, provided that such an agreement: 
(a) has substantial sectoral coverage(1), and 
(b) provides for the presence or elimination of substantially all discrimination, in 
the sense of Article XVII, between or among the parties, in the sectors covered 
under subparagraph (a), through: 
(i) elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or 
(ii) prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures. 
Either at the entry into force of that agreement or on the basis of a reasonable time-frame, except 
for measures permitted under Articles XI, XII and XIV. 
2. In evaluating whether the conditions under paragraph 1(b) are met, consideration 
may be given to the relationship of the agreement to a wider process of economic 
integration or trade liberalization among the countries concerned. 
(a) Where developing countries are parties to an agreement of the type referred to 
in paragraph 1, flexibility shall be provided for regarding the conditions set out in 
paragraph 1, particularly with reference to subparagraph (b) thereof, in accordance 
with the level of development of the countries concerned, both overall and in 
individual sectors and subsectors.  
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have proven relatively easy to satisfy in part because of the WTO’s failure to 
provide interpretations to the meaning of such crucial terms as “duties and 
other restrictive regulations” and “substantially all trade” in Article XXIV and 
“substantially all discrimination” in GATS Art. V.94  All U.S. FTAs aim to 
eliminate restrictions on all trade95 and to cover as many service sectors 
possible.  The second requirement only demands that the parties not raise 
barriers to non-members when the free trade agreement is formed and is, 
therefore, easily satisfied.  The third requirement of compliance within a 
“reasonable time” was interpreted by the WTO to mean that any free trade 
agreement be implemented no more than ten years except for “exceptional 
cases.”96  U.S. FTAs with developing countries probably satisfy the ten-year 
requirement since most restrictions are phased out by that time.97  Should there 
ever be true scrutiny of free trade agreements by the WTO, however, the much 
longer time frames for the FTAs could be justified as offering consideration for 
the needs of developing countries.  Given the GATT/WTO history of not 
disapproving regional arrangements,98 it has been easy for the United States to 
comply with the structure of free trade areas demanded by Article XXIV and 
GATS V. 
 
The major elements of GATS Art. V are (1) “substantial sectoral coverage” of the trade services 
among the parties; (2) that “substantially all discrimination has to be eliminated either at entry 
into force or on a “reasonable time-frame” and (3) that the agreement area not raise the overall 
level of barriers compared to before the formation of the economic integration area.  World Trade 
Report 2007, supra note 14, at 307. 
 94. See id. at 308–312 for a discussion of the GATT Art. XXIV and GATS Art. V elements 
which have not been fully defined and how they might be interpreted. 
 95. See DR-CAFTA, supra note 10, ch. 3, Annex 3.3.  See also USTR, DR-CAFTA FACTS:  
FREE TRADE WITH CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 
CAFTA, CAFTA POLICY BRIEF (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_ 
Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/Briefing_Book/asset_upload_file74_7284.pdf.  See also U.S.-Peru 
FTA, supra note 10, at ch. 2, Annex 2.3. 
 96. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement Tariffs 
and Trade 1994 provides: “The ‘reasonable length of time’ referred to in paragraph 5(c) of Art. 
XXIV should exceed 10 years only in exceptional cases.”  There is no clear consensus in the 
WTO about what constitutes an “exceptional case.”  World Trade Report 2007, supra note 14, at 
310.  There is a similar lack of consensus on what a “reasonable time-frame” for complying with 
GATS V means.  U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 10, ch. 2, Annex 2.3. 
 97. The recent U.S. FTAs with developing countries have tariff phase outs that go on for 15, 
17 or 20 years.  The long time frames are reserved for import sensitive products, usually 
agricultural goods.  Industrial goods are always phased out by year ten of each agreement. 
  NAFTA was negotiated before the Art. XXIV Understanding and phases out tariff 
elimination over fifteen years.  See NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 302.  In this respect, the U.S. 
FTAs match many other FTAs, where the common pattern is for 90% of most imports to be duty-
free by the tenth year of implementation.  World Trade Report 2007, supra note 14, at 309. 
 98. See supra text accompanying note 13 for a discussion of the GATT/WTO oversight of 
this issue. 
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In order to establish a free trade area, the parties concentrate on eliminating 
barriers to each other.  This requires designing rules to ensure that only the 
FTA parties actually benefit from the removal of those barriers—the crucial 
Rules of Origin.99  These rules can easily be negotiated as part of the 
agreement.  Unlike the customs union, in which parties must create a common 
external tariff and therefore trade policy, FTA partners do not need to establish 
a legislative institution within the FTA to achieve this goal.  Rather, each 
country can implement its FTA obligations while largely retaining its own 
respective trade policymaking regime.  This aspect of free trade areas meets 
the U.S. preference for limited institutionalism and retention of as much 
sovereignty as possible.  During the U.S.-Canada negotiating process, for 
example, the United States completely resisted a push for the possibility of 
achieving common legislation in unfair trade rules and pushed instead for a 
dispute settlement mechanism that would review each country’s appreciation 
of its own law. 
The third reason the United States prefers free trade areas is the flexibility 
allowed by the form.  One preference has been to, if possible, accommodate 
regionalism with the long-held U.S. commitment to multilateralism as the best 
form for trade liberalization.  All U.S. FTAs are, therefore, built around GATT 
compliance and core GATT concepts.  The other preference—unilateral in 
nature—has been to use regionalism to keep pushing the U.S. agenda on legal 
disciplines even if the multilateralism system is not ready or unwilling to 
accommodate those rules.100 
The U.S. model FTA reflects all of these U.S. goals—GATT compliance 
and consistency, limited institutionalism and moving the rules agenda forward.  
The development of the model began with the U.S.-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement, the first free trade agreement to include trade in services and 
investment.  However, all of the major components of the basic model really 
came together in NAFTA.  The continued use of the model can be traced to 
 
 99. Rules of Origin are crucial for a free trade area because they specify which products are 
entitled to duty-free treatment.  NAFTA established the set of basic rules of origin still used in 
U.S. trade FTAs.  These rules are widely regarded as complex.  See Jorge Alberto Ramirez, Rules 
of Origin: NAFTA's Heart, But FTAA's Heartburn, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 617, 641–42 (2004) for 
a short description of how the rules operate.  The rules, which are negotiated specifically for 
many products, actually comprise the greatest part of any U.S. FTA.  The NAFTA model 
provides for a high degree of variation across product categories.  This type of variation is what 
allows sectoral interest groups (i.e., industry groups) to shape the rules to protect certain areas of 
trade. 
 100. One example of an area of U.S. interest is extending multilateral discipline over 
investment.  Although investment was part of the Doha Agenda, the WTO General Council 
withdrew the topic from the negotiations agenda in 2004.  Trade and Development Report 2007, 
supra note 6, at 11.  Free trade agreement negotiations, however, remain a way for the United 
States to keep the issue alive. 
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several factors.  The first and most obvious is the issue of power.  Apart from 
Canada, the United States has never had to negotiate with a trading partner of 
close or equal bargaining power.  All of the post-NAFTA FTAs, except for 
Australia, have been with developing countries.  The resulting asymmetry in 
bargaining power allows the United States not only to offer the model as a 
template for negotiations, but also to insist on adherence to most of its 
components. 
Power dynamics, however, are not only the factor in play.  The model has 
proven its utility.  The flexibility of the form allows the United States to go 
beyond trade in goods and services to include investment and other issues, 
such as intellectual property rights, or add new chapters on trade areas that 
developed after NAFTA.  The format also leaves room for particularized 
negotiations with partners over including or excluding some subject matter 
areas, how to treat special sectors or products, regulatory limitations and 
capacity constraints.101  At the same time, use of the model allows for freezing 
the language on key concepts because the United States and other FTA 
partners know what they mean.  Meanwhile, actual working experience under 
the FTAs, developed through the subject matters committees established in 
NAFTA,102 as well as dispute settlement interpretations103 has led the United 
States and other FTA partners to renegotiate and rework the standard text.104 
 
 101. Particularized negotiations are always required in trade for goods on special rules of 
origin and tariff phase-outs.  For an analysis of those in DR-CAFTA, see DR-CAFTA Report, 
supra note 83, at 34–41.  In U.S. FTAs, there are always several chapters on services because 
liberalization in those chapters is not just about eliminating barriers, but also about dealing with 
regulatory structures.  Each FTA partner must retain as much regulatory oversight as necessary to 
guarantee services to its population.  As a result, the services chapters make explicit government 
powers to regulate.  For an illustration of the importance of regulatory oversight, see DR-
CAFTA, supra note 10, art. 12.10. 
 102. All U.S. FTAs create a Free Trade Commission comprised of the trade ministers of the 
participating parties.  The actual work of the agreements is done in sub-committees and working 
groups established for various subject matter area commitments.  For an illustration, see DR-
CAFTA, supra note 10, art. 19.1(3) (giving the Free Trade Commission authority to delegate 
subcommittees and working groups power to modify the tariff phase-out schedule, common 
guidelines on tariffs and government procurement matters).  See also U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 
10, ch. 20.1. 
 103. The U.S. experience with investor-state arbitration has led to a significant revision of 
two major provisions of Chapter 11, Minimum Standard of Treatment (Art. 1105) and 
Expropriation (Art. 1110).  For an analysis of how the results in Chapter 11 arbitrations altered 
the investment chapter model FTA, see Meg Kinnear & Robin Hansen, The Influence of Chapter 
11 in the BIT Landscape, 12 U.C. DAVIS INT’L L & POL’Y 101, 106–112 (2005).  See also David 
A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions from NAFTA to the United States-Chile 
Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.  679, 683 (2004).   
 104. Core provisions of Chapter 11 have been renegotiated and redrafted to clarify the 
meaning of concepts.  Compare NAFTA, supra note 22, ch. 11 (arts. 1105, 1110), with U.S.-Peru 
FTA, supra note 10, at ch. 11 (arts. 1105, 1110, Annexes 10-A, 10-B). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
180 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII:155 
The use of the model also allows the United States to negotiate more 
efficiently.  By using the same template of issues to cover and the same 
agreement, the United States does not have to expend negotiating resources on 
designing an agreement with each FTA partner from the ground up.  Instead, 
the United States can concentrate on negotiating areas of each FTA that require 
alteration or compromise. 
The United States has employed two models in its FTAs: the NAFTA 
model and the WTO-plus model.  The shift to the WTO-plus model, 
characterized by requiring its FTA partners to make additional commitments 
on several key subject matter areas, occurred after the United States 
encountered difficulties in the FTAA negotiations and in the Doha Round.  
Although it expands on some requirements, the WTO-plus model shares the 
same basic design and core substantive obligations as the NAFTA model. 
The design of the FTAs is one of the most consistent aspects of U.S. FTAs.  
With the notable exception of the U.S.-Jordan FTA,105 all of the U.S. FTAs are 
heavily drafted documents comprised of approximately sixteen subject areas 
and chapters (with others devoted to institutional matters)106 that run for 
hundreds of pages. 
The first chapter of the FTA is devoted to the objectives of the agreement 
and general definitions.  The first article in the model always declares the 
intention of the parties—consistent with GATT Article XXIV—to establish a 
free trade area.107  All of the subject matter chapters exhibit the same structure 
by beginning with either definitions or general obligations regarding the 
subject and ending with detailed annexes containing exceptions and 
 
  Investor-state arbitrations may also have been one of the reasons why some recent FTAs 
do not contain competition chapters.  D. Daniel Sokol, Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why 
Countries Enter into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements, 
83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 231, 274 (2008).  There are no competition chapters in the recent DR-
CAFTA, Morocco or Bahrain FTAs.  According to Sokol, the United States is not the country 
pushing for such chapters.  “The United States position may be best described as one that does 
not oppose competition policy chapters as long as the chapters remain non-binding and the FTA 
counter-party finds the inclusion of such a chapter to be important.”  Id. at 258–59. 
 105. The U.S.-Jordan FTA is the only FTA that is not heavily drafted—it is only twenty pages 
long.  See U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 10. 
 106. The ITC reviewed the first comprehensive FTAs based on the NAFTA model in a report 
in 2005.  According to its analysis the model FTA consists of twenty to twenty-four chapters, all 
organized in the same order in all of the agreements, with annexes (to address non-conforming 
measures with regard to services), sometimes containing separate chapters on specific industry 
sectors or regulatory issues.  ITC IMPACT REPORT, supra note 70, at 2-2 tbl. 2.1 (comparing the 
structure/contents Singapore, Chile and Morocco agreements on a grid). 
 107. For an illustration, see KORUS, supra note 10, art. 1.1 (“Consistent with Article XXIV 
of GATT 1994 and Article V of GATS, the Parties hereby establish a free trade area in 
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.”) 
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reservations, or special forms of implementation for the general rules.108  The 
FTAs also tend to have side letters that are considered to be part of the text.109  
These letters have been developed, unlike the reservations and exceptions, in 
response to congressional demands made during the implementation process. 
The model adopts core GATT trade concepts—most favored nation and 
national treatment—in the chapters on trade in goods and services.  Rather than 
simply borrowing the language of the relevant GATT article, the model 
requires the parties to follow the GATT or GATS concept itself, including later 
interpretations.110  The General Exceptions chapter uses GATT similarly, 
requiring the parties to incorporate Article XI.111  This drafting decision serves 
several purposes.  It acts to signal general adherence to GATT discipline by 
underscoring NAFTA’s consistency with its major agreements.  The adoption 
of GATT/GATS rules also aids in the later interpretation of the relevant FTA 
provision.  Since GATT (and, where applicable, GATS) is incorporated, each 
FTA partner has the option of pursuing an FTA violation based on the 
provision in the WTO or the FTA itself.112  Consequently, whichever forum is 
chosen, there should be consistent interpretation of the concept.113  The choice 
 
 108. Chapters are built around general obligations.  In order to understand what a partner 
country has agreed to, the annexes are the place to look. 
 109. All U.S. FTAs have side letters but not all side letters are the same.  Some are “records 
of understanding while others can amount to agreed upon interpretations that can add to or make 
effective changes.”  ITC IMPACT REPORT, supra note 70, at 2–6. 
 110. In NAFTA, this technique was used with key GATT concepts—national treatment and 
the prohibition on quantitative restrictions.  With respect to national treatment, for example, 
NAFTA provides: 
Each party shall accord national treatment to goods of another Party in accordance with 
Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), including its 
interpretive notes, or any equivalent provision of a successor agreement to which all 
Parties are a party, are incorporated into and made part of this Agreement.   
NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 301. 
 After the completion of the Uruguay Round, which adopted GATT in 1994, the language was 
changed for all later FTAs.  Compare NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 301 with DR-CAFTA, supra 
note 10, on National Treatment: 
Each party shall accord national treatment to the goods of another Party in accordance 
with Article III of the GATT 1994, including its interpretive notes, and to this end Article 
III of GATT 1994 and its interpretive notes are incorporated into and made part of this 
Agreement, mutatis mutandis.   
DR-CAFTA, supra note 10, art 3.2. 
 111. Compare DR-CAFTA, supra note 10, art. 3.8 with NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 309(1). 
 112. All FTAs have a choice of forum provision in the chapter on dispute settlement.  
Compare DR-CAFTA, supra note 10, art. 20.3 with NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 2005(1).  In DR-
CAFTA, the choice of forum extends to yet another regional agreement dispute settlement system 
to cover disputes arising between two of the DR-CAFTA members which are members of another 
regional agreement. 
 113. There is no concept of precedent in international law.  However, both NAFTA panels 
and WTO panels have relied greatly on earlier interpretations by dispute settlement panels. 
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of forum provision was actually inserted into NAFTA when it was drafted, 
even though at the time the Uruguay Round had not yet finished and the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) had not been adopted.  Had 
the Uruguay Round failed, NAFTA parties would have had only the choice of 
the old GATT Article XXIII dispute settlement system114 or the non-binding 
arbitration provided for in NAFTA Chapter 20.115  The later availability of the 
DSU, with its enforcement mechanism,116 has resulted in both the United 
States and its FTA partners in frequently choosing the WTO for resolving 
disputes.117 
Other notable recurring aspects in the commitment chapters are those 
dealing with certain substantive obligations.  The Trade in Goods part of the 
model FTA is built around three main features.118  Tariff elimination is always 
phased in, going from the date of enactment to five years, ten years or beyond.  
The percentage of trade covered by the phase-outs is adjusted for each FTA 
partner according to its market strength or competitiveness.119  The most 
 
 114. The GATT Article XXIII dispute settlement system required GATT adoption of any 
panel decision and allowed the losing party to block the adoption of the report.  The United States 
was so concerned about the inadequacies of the GATT system that it pushed for adoption of a 
new dispute settlement system during the Uruguay Round.  For a thorough review of the U.S. 
position on this issue, see Taylor, supra note 31, at 242–250. 
 115. Under NAFTA Article 2018, the parties to the dispute actually determine its outcome.  
Article 2018 provides: “On receipt of the final report of a panel, the disputing Parties shall agree 
on the resolution of the dispute, which normally shall conform with the determinations and 
recommendations of the panel, and shall notify their Sections of the Secretariat of any agreed 
resolution of any dispute.” NAFTA, supra note 22, at art. 2018(1).  Cf. U.S.-Peru FTA, supra 
note 10, art. 21.15 (which simplifies the language but has the same non-binding effect). 
 116. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 1125–1226 
(1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm. 
 117. The United States has pursued most of its major trade complaints against Canada in the 
WTO’s DSU system: Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals (DS 31), Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products (DS 103).  Canada has done the same 
with major complaints: Certain Measures Affecting the Import of Cattle, Swine and Grain (DS 
144), Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (DS 234), Dispute with Respect to 
Certain Softwood Lumber (DS 236, 247, 257, 264, 277, 311), Subsidies and Other Domestic 
Support for Corn and Other Agricultural Products (357).  The same pattern has been true for the 
United States and Mexico.  WTO, Dispute Settlement: Disputes by Country, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm. 
 118. In NAFTA, the part on trade in goods (Part II) always covers both Market Access and 
National Treatment.  This is true for all later U.S. FTAs as well.  Included in the part are also 
special provisions related to sensitive sectors of trade.  See NAFTA, supra note 22, pt. 2. In later 
agreements, there are often breakouts of some of these provisions for separate chapters.  See U.S.-
Peru FTA, supra note 10, chs. 2, 3. 
 119. The United States first encountered the issue of how to balance obligations on tariff 
elimination—the single biggest factor towards opening up trade in goods—when it negotiated 
with Mexico during NAFTA.  Mexico took great efforts to make the United States understand its 
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sensitive products for both parties are always back-loaded in this phase-out, 
thereby giving each partner the opportunity to obtain the best possible 
adjustment for the affected industry.  A separate chapter is usually reserved for 
agriculture, the least-disciplined area of trade.  The agricultural trade chapter 
allows the parties to retain trade policies eliminated in the other trade-in-goods 
chapters tariffs, quotas and tariff-rate quotas. 
Core chapters are also included on Rules of Origin and on Customs 
Administration.  Both chapters cover key aspects of the actual operation of a 
free trade area, and each chapter addresses obligations placed not only on the 
parties but also on citizens.  The Rules of Origin specify which goods are 
entitled to duty-free treatment.  The Customs Administration obligations 
require implementation obligations for the FTA partner about how to provide 
assistance to traders and enforcement with regard to the rules of origin.  The 
NAFTA model established the pattern of having general, quite restrictive rules 
of origin as well as special rules of origin for selected sectors of interest to the 
FTA partners.120  Of particular relevance to developing countries are the 
special rules of origin for textiles and clothing.121 
In the chapter(s) on trade in services, the NAFTA model uses the negative 
list approach.  This means that the overall obligations to liberalize and to 
provide non-discriminatory treatment with regard to regulations apply to all 
service sectors except those reserved at the time of negotiations and reflected 
in the annexes.122 
 
status as a developing country and the adjustments it would have to make.  HERMANN VON 
BERTRAB, NEOGIATING NAFTA: A MEXICAN ENVOY’S ACCOUNT 46 (1997). 
 120. These restrictive Rules of Origin are a well-recognized and entrenched aspect of the U.S. 
model. 
 121. In recent U.S. FTAs with Latin American countries, these chapters are crucial.  Since the 
textile sector is still relatively undisciplined, like agriculture, a U.S. FTA partner must try to 
negotiate provisions that will allow the greatest market access possible.  The textile rules receive 
extended treatment in DR-CAFTA.  In DR-CAFTA, the United States did agree to phase out all 
remaining multilateral quotas but obtained a special safeguards measure for textile imports.  The 
parties also agreed to special customs cooperation procedures to aid in dealing with rule of origin 
issues.  See DR-CAFTA, supra note 10, arts. 3.22, 3.23 and 3.24. 
 122. This is completely different from the GATS “positive list” approach, in which a service 
sector is not covered unless clearly specified.  Use of the negative list approach does force greater 
liberalization of services and locks in prior liberalization by an FTA partner.  The use of the 
negative list approach also means that any new service will automatically be covered by the 
agreement.  Finally, even though an FTA partner can take exceptions (keep non-conforming 
measures) by designating them as such and including them in the agreement, if they later 
liberalize a non-conforming measure, that measure becomes “bound” and must be continued.  
ITC IMPACT REPORT, supra note 70, at 2–14.  The non-conforming measures or exceptions taken 
by each FTA party are attached as Annexes to the FTA. 
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The other standard commitment chapters are on investment,123 intellectual 
property rights,124 government procurement,125 competition policy, standards 
(sanitary and phytosanitary and technical barriers to trade),126 labor rights and 
environmental cooperation.127  Not all of these standard chapters originated in 
the same way.  The investment chapter entered the model from the U.S.-
Canada FTA but took its final form in NAFTA with the addition of 
investor/host state arbitration.  The services, intellectual property and standards 
chapters were drafted before completion of the WTO’s corresponding chapters.  
Undoubtedly, the Uruguay Round drafts were used as models for each.  At the 
time they were completed and NAFTA went into force, it was not clear that the 
Uruguay Round would complete and so each chapter became important as an 
illustration of how agreements on these issues could be reached between 
developed and developing countries.  The labor and environmental chapters, 
which began in NAFTA as side agreements, were negotiated in response to a 
new political regime in the United States—with the election of President 
Clinton—and by the need to obtain the approval of a Congress that had shifted 
in composition from the start of negotiations. 
The evolution to the WTO-plus model is easy to trace in several of these 
commitment chapters. The chapter on intellectual property offers the best 
illustration of the shift.  The structure of the NAFTA model has been retained.  
Each IP chapter begins with general obligations: to adhere to specified 
multilateral IP agreements and the right to offer more extensive protection than 
that specified in the agreement.128  Consequently, the FTA provisions on 
 
 123. The U.S. FTA chapters on investment cover investor rights and protections in Part A and 
provide for binding investor-state arbitration in Part B.  The investor rights and protections are the 
same in each (National Treatment, MFN Treatment, Minimum Standard of Treatment, 
Expropriation and Compensation, Transfers, Performance Requirements, Senior Management of 
Boards and Directors).  Recently enacted FTAs, DR-CAFTA and Peru, also contain provisions 
for non-discriminatory treatment of investors, including restitution and/or compensation for any 
investment losses coming from armed conflict or civil strife.  See U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 10, 
at art. 10.6; DR-CAFTA, supra note 10, art. 10.6. 
 124. See infra at note 128 for a discussion of IP chapters. 
 125. All U.S. FTAs cover government procurement.  The FTAs on this topic open up more 
trade than commitments under the Agreement on Government Procurement.  See, e.g., U.S.-Peru 
FTA, supra note 10, ch. 9. 
 126. All of the U.S. FTAs have chapters on sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards and 
technical barriers to trade.  Standards pose perhaps the most significant non-tariff barrier to trade 
because developing country FTA partners facing the United States—with its high standards—
must make sure their products are compatible in order to access the market.  See, e.g., U.S.-Peru 
FTA, supra note 10, ch. 6. 
 127. The labor and environmental chapters of U.S. FTAs have been controversial since 
NAFTA.  Nevertheless, the need to obtain congressional approval has meant that they have been 
included in all U.S. FTAs. 
 128. NAFTA also had provisions devoted to protection for trade secrets, industrial design and 
the lay-out design of integrated circuits.  NAFTA, supra note 22, arts. 1710, 1713.  The recent 
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intellectual property rights constitute the minimum protections a party must 
provide.  The core of the text is comprised of the obligations that must be 
assumed with respect to the major forms of intellectual property recognized in 
NAFTA: patent, copyright and geographical indications first covered in 
NAFTA.129  The final section of the chapters contains all of the civil and 
criminal enforcement obligations required by FTA parties.130 
During the course of all FTA negotiations, USTR has developed what it 
considers to be a “model FTA intellectual property text” that forms the basis 
for other agreements.131  Technological developments since NAFTA account 
for part of why the model text has evolved.132  However, the text also has 
developed around general explicit concerns of the USTR, its advisory 
committee on intellectual property (ITAC-15) and U.S. industry about the 
status of global intellectual property protection.  IPR-based industries have 
turned principally toward FTAs to push their agenda on higher standards of 
protection and the need to keep up with enforcement procedures to protect 
those rights through the FTA process.133  The evolved model text reveals the 
U.S. goal of expanding the scope of substantive protections.  All recent FTAs 
go well beyond TRIPS obligations.134  FTA partners must sign on to an 
 
FTAs have followed the same template of covering trademarks, geographical indications, domain 
names on the internet, copyrights and patent, in that order.  See U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 10, ch. 
16; DR-CAFTA, supra note 10, ch. 15; U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 10, ch.17. 
 129. INDUSTRY TRADE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
(ITAC-15), THE U.S.-PERU TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT (TPA): THE INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY PROVISIONS (2006) at 3 [hereinafter PERU ITAC REPORT], available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Reports/asset_upload_file473
_8978.pdf.  The exact same language is used in the ITAC-15 report for the pending U.S.-Panama 
FTA.  See INDUSTRY TRADE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
(ITAC-15), THE U.S.-PANAMA TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT (TPA): THE INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY PROVISIONS (2007) at 3 [hereinafter PANAMA ITAC REPORT], available at 
http://ustr.gov/assets/ 
Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Panama_FTA/Reports/asset_upload_file960_11234.pdf. 
 130. The enforcement chapters have grown in length and complexity.  Compare U.S.-Peru 
FTA, supra note 10, art. 16.11 with NAFTA, supra note 22, arts. 1714–18. 
 131. See PERU ITAC REPORT, supra note 129, at 3; see also PANAMA ITAC REPORT, supra 
note 129, at 3.  (The ITAC reports even follow a model of the IP issues discussed). 
 132. PERU ITAC REPORT, supra note 129, at 5, states: 
“[T]he PTPA takes into account the significant legal and technological developments that 
have occurred since the TRIPs and NAFTA agreements entered into force and mirrors, 
and, in many areas, improves upon the Singapore, Chile, and CAFTA-DR in order to 
establish clear precedents in most key areas of IP protection for future FTA negotiations, 
many of which precedents were also followed in the FTAs with Morocco, Bahrain, and 
Oman.”   
Id. 
 133. Id. at 4. 
 134. The ITAC-15 report on the U.S.-Peru FTA states that “the fact that Peru found it in its 
own interest to significantly increase its levels of IPR protection beyond that required by TRIPs is 
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increasing number of major multilateral IP treaties.  The model text requires 
extension of the term of protection in two major forms of IP rights—patent and 
copyright.135  New FTA agreements are considered successful based on how 
closely the extended protection term procured in a particular FTA comes to 
U.S. standards.136 
The model IP text also emphasizes the growing importance of the 
enforcement of IP rights.  The U.S. position is that enforcement has lagged 
well behind the adoption of IP legislation on standards and that new 
technologies, such as the Internet, have made enforcement problems greater.  
To date, however, the United States has not been able to obtain its preference 
for solving the problem—that FTA partners bind themselves to “specific 
performance standards in the area of enforcement.”137  The model text 
advances in this area have focused instead on making statutory damages 
available for piracy and counterfeiting and extending some of the other civil 
remedies made discretionary under the TRIPS Agreement, as well as 
 
testament to the principle that high levels of protection benefits indigenous creators and inventors 
in the same manner as they do in developed countries.”  Id. at 5. 
 135. In recent FTAs, the United States has pushed for the extension of copyright term closer 
to U.S. levels of life of the author plus ninety-five years.  It has only achieved that commitment 
with Oman.  In the Peru and Panama agreements, the countries would only agree to what ITAC-
15 calls the compromise of seventy years.  PANAMA ITAC REPORT, supra note 129, at 12; PERU 
ITAC REPORT, supra note 129, at 12.  This goes well beyond the TRIPS minimum standard of 
fifty years.  TRIPS, supra note 71, art. 12. 
  With regard to patents, the protection offered would be extended if the issuance of the 
patent was subject to “unreasonable delay.” U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 10, art. 16.9(6)(b). Since 
developing countries frequently take longer to issue patents than developed countries, this 
provision will ensure a patent holder the full enjoyment of the patent term.  In the U.S.-Peru FTA, 
“unreasonable delay” was the later of five years from filing or three years after an examination 
request.  PERU ITAC REPORT, supra note 129, at 15.  In earlier FTAs, USTR had negotiated even 
better terms—the later of four years from filing or two years from examination.  Id. 
  On patents, the FTA also prohibits the marketing approval of generic drugs during the 
term of the drug patent.  This provision effectively extends the life of the patent since competing 
countries must wait until after the patent has run to produce a competing product. 
 136. See PERU ITAC REPORT, supra note 129, at 5 (urging the USTR to obtain a U.S.-level 
standard, as was done in several of the MEFTA bilateral FTAs in future agreements). 
 137. Id. at 18–19.  The United States wants its FTA partners to accept such standards because 
despite long term success at obtaining multilateral discipline through rulemaking, the United 
States still continues “to suffer billions of dollars in losses due to global piracy, counterfeiting and 
other infringements of rights provided in TRIPS (and in the various FTAs)—primarily due to 
ineffective enforcement by these trading partners.”  Id. at 18. 
  It is relatively easy for a developing country to legislate new IP rights protection, but 
significantly more difficult to enforce those obligations because of the implementation costs 
involved, and TRIPS does not provide assistance regarding this issue.  See J. Michael Finger, The 
Doha Agenda and Development: A View from the Uruguay Round 8–12 (Asian Dev. Bank, ERD 
Working Paper No. 21, 2002), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/ERD/Working_ 
Papers/wp021.pdf (describing the implementation costs of IP rights obligations). 
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expanding provisional and criminal remedies to tackle wide-scale 
infringements.138  A review of the types of provisions the United States would 
prefer in the criminal remedies context would require an FTA partner to have 
its courts adopt sentencing guidelines and widen its conception of search 
orders.139  It is clear that the United States would like to import its concepts on 
such issues into FTA partners’ legal systems.140 
In the WTO-plus evolution of the model, other chapters have now become 
standard: electronic commerce,141 transparency/anti-corruption142 and trade 
capacity building.143  When the NAFTA model was established, electronic 
 
 138. PERU ITAC REPORT, supra note 129, at 19–20.  See U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 10, at 
art. 16.11(11–17) (civil remedies), art. 16.11(18–25) (provisional remedies), art. 16.11(26–28) 
(criminal remedies). 
 139. PERU ITAC REPORT, supra note 129, at 22–23. 
 140. Id. 
 141. The chapters on electronic commerce were first added to the model in the agreements 
with Chile, Singapore, Australia and Morocco.  See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 10, ch. 15; U.S.-
Singapore FTA, supra note 10, ch. 14; U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 10, ch. 16; U.S.-Morocco 
FTA, supra note 10, ch. 14. 
 142. The chapters on transparency and corruption provisions first appeared in the FTA with 
Morocco.  See U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra note 10, ch. 18(18.1–18.4) (transparency requiring the 
publication of all rules, regulations, and the due process rights allowed citizens concerning 
notification, administrative proceedings and review and appeal of administrative or judicial 
proceedings); ch. 18(18.5) (measures criminalizing corrupt payments).  The other two FTAs 
negotiated and enacted at around the same time, with Chile and Australia, have the transparency 
obligations but no provision on anti-corruption.  U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 10, ch. 20; U.S.-
Australia FTA, supra note 10, ch. 20; U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra note 10, ch. 14.  All of the 
recent FTAs (DR-CAFTA, Peru and the pending FTAs with Panama, Colombia and KORUS) 
have a slightly expanded section on anti-corruption.  DR-CAFTA, supra note 10, ch. 18, sec. B; 
U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 10, ch. 19, sec. B; U.S.-Panama FTA, supra note 10, ch. 18, sec. B; 
U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 10, ch. 19, sec. B; KORUS, supra note 10, ch. 21, art. 21.6. 
  Transparency has always been a core principle of U.S. FTAs.  See NAFTA, supra note 
22, art. 102(1) (stating that one of the objectives of NAFTA is transparency).  By placing the 
transparency obligations in a separate chapter, the WTO-plus model underscores the connection 
between good governance and strong economics.  Anti-corruption is now widely regarded as one 
of the biggest constraints facing developing countries as they pursue economic growth.  Omar 
Azfar, Young Lee & Anand Swamy, The Causes and Consequences of Corruption, 573 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 42, 43–44 (2001).  The World Bank, with its mission of eradicating 
poverty, for example, has made anti-corruption a priority, aiming its efforts at World Bank 
projects.  The link between corruption and development has attracted a great deal of attention.  
See generally id. at 50–53 (noting studies that have found corruption negatively impacts both the 
rate of investment and GDP growth, and that better institutional quality is linked to economic 
growth). 
 143. Trade Capacity Building was first added to U.S. FTAs in the DR-CAFTA.  See DR-
CAFTA, supra note 10, ch. 19, sec. B.  See generally U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 10, ch. 20; U.S.-
Panama FTA, supra note 10, ch. 19; U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 10, ch. 20 (containing 
similar provisions).  Befitting its level of economic development, KORUS lacks any trade 
capacity building provisions.  KORUS, supra note 10.  The United States coordinates trade 
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commerce was non-existent (though it later became an issue of concern).  The 
transparency/anti-corruption and trade capacity building chapters were added 
in response to the shift in FTAs partners that occurred over time.  Some recent 
FTA partners—particularly those in Latin America—are at much lower levels 
of development than previous partners.144  Areas of particular concern to these 
countries are the need to improve governance (hence the inclusion of a 
transparency/anti-corruption chapter) and to build up the capacity to benefit 
from trade agreements (which lead to the addition of the trade capacity 
building chapter). 
Other issues have deliberately been kept out of either U.S. model.  The 
United States will not subject the entire area of agriculture to the FTA process, 
and it takes the position that this can only be dealt with at the multilateral 
level.145  Two other issues are also off the table in U.S. FTA negotiations: 
 
capacity building assistance through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).  
Trade capacity building was aimed at assisting countries with accession to and implementation of 
WTO agreements and to “build the physical, human, and institutional capacity to benefit more 
broadly from a rules-based trading system.” U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S. TRADE 
CAPACITY BUILDING EXTENSIVE BUT ITS EFFECTIVENESS HAS YET TO BE EVALUATED 3, 
GAO-05-150 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05150.pdf [hereinafter GAO 2005 
REPORT].  The connection to U.S. FTAs is the existence of a USAID/USTR interagency group 
formed to assist countries involved in free trade negotiations.  Such efforts were made with regard 
to DR-CAFTA.  Id. at 3–4. Congress began to appropriate funds for trade capacity building 
programs in 2003.  Id. at 6–7.  The largest proportion of projects funded out of trade capacity 
building was for trade facilitation, which includes customs operation and administration as well 
as regional trade agreement capacity (defined as “to increase the ability of regional trade 
agreements and individual countries to facilitate trade and help potential regional trade agreement 
members”).  Id. at 9. 
  Trade Capacity Building (TCB) Projects aimed at the Latin American FTA partners of 
the United States include: a project in Central America “to improve labor law compliance” and in 
El Salvador a project to help Salvadoran food producers meet sanitary and phytosanitary 
standards with regard to exports of fruits and vegetables.  Id. at 13–14.  The USAID approach to 
regional economic growth in Central America has been done by “taking stock of each 
government’s capabilities through diagnostic tools.” Id. at 22.  During negotiations for recent 
FTAs, particularly those in Central America and the Andean region, the USTR led a working 
group on trade capacity building to help the countries implement the FTAs.  Id. at 26.  The USTR 
suggests trade capacity building initiatives, but actual projects are worked out later.  Id. 
  In its most recent self report to the WTO, the United States described FTAs as capable of 
promoting innovation and providing participating countries “with trade capacity building to 
develop negotiating skills promoting investment, job creation and higher business standards.” 
US/TPR, supra note 21, at 17. 
 144. Honduras and Nicaragua are the least-developed countries. 
 145. The United States refused to negotiate over the major agricultural barriers facing 
developing countries (tariff peaks and escalation and production subsidies) even in hemispheric 
FTAA negotiations.  It has never been on the table in any bilateral FTA. 
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unfair trade statutes146 and labor mobility.147  The reasons for their exclusion 
are not based on a perceived lack of importance; to the contrary, both issues 
have great impact on trade in goods (unfair trade statutes) and trade in services 
(labor mobility).  Both unfair trade statutes and labor mobility, however, are so 
controversial and politically charged that any inclusion would probably kill a 
U.S. FTA.148 
In the case of unfair trade statutes, they play several vital roles in design of 
U.S. trade policy.  First, the historical roots of both the anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty laws are quite deep.  Second, the United States has long 
been committed to relative openness.  Without the safety value of unfair trade 
statutes for ailing/uncompetitive industries, the United States would face far 
greater cries of protectionism.  In the U.S.-Canada FTA and NAFTA, the 
United States resisted arguments for abolishing or reforming the legislation 
and instead substituted dispute resolution in its place.149  For later FTAs, the 
subject has not been covered at all. 
In the case of labor mobility, although greater openness in this area would 
be of great interest and advantage to developing country FTA partners, it is 
also unlikely to join the model.150  Allowing true mobility, particularly of 
unskilled labor, would involve major changes to U.S. domestic immigration 
policy.  For the first time an FTA would entail major domestic implementation 
problems, something that is routine for its developing country FTA partners.  
Since labor mobility would not be an area of U.S. comparative advantage, 
there is no incentive for the United States to engage on this issue. 
 
 146. U.S. FTAs do have rules on safeguards but not on the anti-dumping and countervailing 
duty rules of the parties.  This is true even though neither of the U.S. trade partners in NAFTA 
wanted antidumping in that free trade agreement.  See Sokol, supra note 104, at 278.  This poses 
a problem for developing countries because the United States aggressively uses its anti-dumping 
statute. 
 147. The only labor-mobility issue in U.S. FTAs is over temporary entry for business visitors, 
traders and investors, intra-company transferees and professionals.  NAFTA, supra note 22, ch. 
16, annex 1603 (spelling out in detail the people who fall into each group). 
 148. Under the recently expired TPA, the President was required to report to Congress within 
180 days before the acceptance of any agreement if such an agreement could impact existing 
antidumping laws.  See TPA, supra note 28, § 3804(d)(3)(A).  It is unlikely that the next 
Congress to renew TPA would see the issue differently.  One view is that it is the absence of anti-
dumping that makes it possible for key sectors of industry in countries to support trade 
agreements.  See generally SAFEGUARDS & ANTIDUMPING IN LATIN AMERICAN TRADE 
LIBERALIZATION: FIGHTING FIRE WITH FIRE (J. Michael Finger & Julio J. Nogués eds., The 
World Bank and Palgrave Macmillan 2006). 
 149. Sokol, supra note 104, at 278. 
 150. See generally Karen E. Bravo, Regional Trade Agreements and Labor Liberalization: 
(Lost) Opportunities for Experimentation? 28 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 71 (forthcoming 2009) 
(giving a complete introduction to the issue of labor mobility). 
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IV.  DOES THE U.S. FTA APPROACH DELIVER WHAT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
SEEK? 
Developing countries enter into U.S. FTAs to spur economic growth and 
development.  The major goals a developing country must achieve for an 
agreement to have the desired effects are secure market access, increased 
foreign direct investment and extensive services sector liberalization.  A 
developing country also needs to enhance its reputation for good economic 
governance in the world community.  Making significant progress with respect 
to all of these goals should allow a developing country to increase wealth, 
competition, employment and productivity. 
How useful is a U.S. FTA in delivering these goals to developing 
countries? The answer varies based upon how the developing country 
negotiates and then implements the FTA.  With regard to the first issue, the 
developing country must negotiate well on issues where it has voice.  This 
requires the country to have figured out its biggest needs from the FTA and 
constraints it will face in attempting to benefit from the agreement prior to 
entering talks.  Diagnostic work has been done on such issues for developing 
countries but often only after the agreements have been negotiated.151 
Given the reality of trade reciprocity with the United States, the developing 
country partner must make sure to open up trade early only in products where 
it is relatively competitive.  The developing country, therefore, must have 
negotiated tariff phase-outs carefully or sought exceptions on particular 
products from less competitive, rural parts of the country.  Some evidence 
indicates that the Mexican experience on this point might be a useful 
illustration.  Mexico suffered significant job loss in rural and poor sections of 
the country following NAFTA because its maize sector was uncompetitive.152  
In DR-CAFTA, an exception was made for countries facing the same problem 
with maize and other food staple products.153 
When considering the effects of investment and competition, the 
developing country also must make wise choices regarding which service 
 
 151. The World Bank has conducted studies on Mexico’s experience under NAFTA to offer 
Latin American countries insight LESSONS FROM NAFTA, supra note 80.  By the time the study 
was out, DR-CAFTA had already been negotiated.  Another example is a report done about DR-
CAFTA after the agreement.  See DR-CAFTA Report, supra note 83. Of course, FTA negotiations 
are confidential and therefore exact repercussions of key provisions (on tariffs for example) could 
not be analyzed prior to completion of an agreement.  Nevertheless, given the model nature of 
U.S. FTAs, these studies should help developing countries understand that trade agreements alone 
are not enough for economic growth and development. 
 152. See Oliver, supra note 80, at 85–89 (noting the significant loss of agricultural jobs in 
Mexico after it opened up to the more efficient and subsidized U.S. imports). 
 153. DR-CAFTA Report, supra note 83, at 34. 
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sectors to liberalize and which to leave off the table.154  In the area of 
intellectual property rights, the developing country must assess its ability to 
absorb U.S. levels of protection given the inevitable tension between IP rights 
and competition, along with the other goals of development.155  For most 
 
 154. This issue can be a difficult one for a developing country.  In the DR-CAFTA 
negotiations, Costa Rica agreed to open up two service sectors, telecommunications and 
insurance, both state-owned monopolies that it had not liberalized earlier in the 1990s. The 
decision by the government not to open earlier was due to strong public opposition to the idea.  
DR-CAFTA Report, supra note 83, at 44.  Under DR-CAFTA, Costa Rica agreed to a partial 
opening in three areas (private network services, internet services and wireless services) over a 
phase-in period.  On the eve of the referendum vote, one of the issues pushed by anti-DR-CAFTA 
forces was that it would damage such state-run companies.  Marla Dickerson, Costa Rica Appears 
to Seal CAFTA, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2007, at C1; ICT Chamber Outlines Benefits of FTA for IT 
Industry, BUSINESS NEWS AMERICAS, Oct. 17, 2007, http://www.bnamericas.com/story.xsql?id_ 
sector=1&id_noticia=410399&Tx_idioma=I&source= (noting that the main sticking point in the 
referendum was “the obligation to partially liberalize the telecommunication market”). 
  Telecommunications providers play a critical role in globalization.  Without the best 
support for this crucial area of infrastructure, it is harder for domestic firms to enter into the real 
way business is done—through global production chains.  See Grant Aldonas, Keynote Address: 
What Would We Bargain for if Development Mattered?, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 29, 36–37 
(2007) (The author noted that what the world trading system really needed to negotiate for in a 
development round would be agriculture, health care, complete liberalization of trade in 
telecommunications—both goods and services—as well as finance and transportation.  According 
to Aldonas the revolution in communications is part of what makes the global supply chain 
possible.)  See also Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 45 (noting that to aid 
in development the provision of physical infrastructure, “particularly transport and 
communications networks, can be as if not more important than the reduction of tariff barriers 
and formal quantitative restrictions”). 
 155. See generally Peter M. Gerhart, The Tragedy of TRIPs, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 143, 172 
(pointing out that the WTO is not the appropriate forum for negotiating IP law because “the 
decision of intellectual property systems requires very careful attention to distributive issue, and 
those distributive issues are difficult to address when law is made by exchanges between nation 
states”). 
  The U.S. FTA negotiating process also does not allow for negotiations over distributive 
issues.  What is tabled for discussion is the model text which aims to expand rights as closely as 
possible to the U.S. standard.  Consequently, issues that could be of great import to developing 
countries, such as legal protection of traditional knowledge, is not really a part of the dialogue.  
Currently, there is no multilateral treatment of the issue at the WTO level.  In recent U.S. FTAs, 
there is only an understanding between the United States and Peru regarding biodiversity and 
traditional knowledge.  The understanding is limited to the two governments acknowledging the 
importance of the issue and a pledge “to share information that may have a bearing on 
patentability of inventions based on traditional knowledge or genetic resources” by making 
accessible to each other (1) publicly available databases of relevant information and (2) the 
opportunity to cite to patent examining authorities prior art that may have a bearing on 
patentability.  U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 10, Understanding Regarding Biodiversity and 
Traditional Knowledge, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Final 
_Texts/asset_upload_file719_9535.pdf. 
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developing country partners, this will mean resisting the arguments for most, if 
not all, the extensions pushed by the United States. 
The other major consequence of dealing with the U.S. model FTA is that 
the developing partner inevitably faces significant implementation obligations.  
Every area of a model FTA requires implementation legislation and the 
dedication of resources.156  For example, to meet trade-in-goods obligations, a 
developing country must update its customs administration.157  The FTA trade-
in-services obligations require altering investment and regulatory legislation 
for newly liberalized sectors.  The commitment to expanded IP rights and 
greater enforcement often requires a complete revision—or, at the very least, 
an updating intellectual property legislation.  Additionally, every developing 
country would have to increase resources for both issuing those IP rights and 
making them actionable.158 
Assuming the developing country has negotiated well and can satisfy its 
implementation obligations, will a U.S. FTA meet its needs?  On the issue of 
secure market access, the U.S. FTA delivers.  The U.S. market will be 
 
  In the pending U.S.-Panama FTA, there is a side letter on traditional knowledge whereby 
the two governments acknowledge the importance of traditional knowledge folklore and pledge to 
work together in the World Intellectual Property Organization on the issue.  Most importantly for 
Panama, however, the letter contains a most favored nation pledge to consult over whether to 
include any provisions relating to traditional knowledge if “the United States and another 
government sign a free trade agreement that contains provisions addressing traditional knowledge 
of folklore.”  See generally POOR PEOPLE’S KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler eds., The World 
Bank and Oxford University Press) (2004). 
 156. Costa Rica, for example, has passed three pieces of implementing legislation and will 
have to pass eight further measures in order for DR-CAFTA to enter into force in that country.  
See Costa Rica Deadline, supra note 26. 
 157. Customs administration is a major aspect of having a workable and effective free trade 
agreement.  A country cannot access the benefits coming from a free trade agreement if customs 
barriers are too high.  In the case of DR-CAFTA customs performance “has been traditionally 
considered deficient by international standards and customs procedures have often been 
considered a major obstacle for business operation in the region.”  DR-CAFTA Report, supra 
note 83, at 190.  In order to deal with these issues, the CAFTA counties will have to deploy a 
modernization strategy. 
 158. A key to dealing with U.S. FTA intellectual property obligations is drafting 
implementing legislation that covers all of the issues.  The United States has discovered in 
dealing with FTA partners that even this first step is difficult.  In its report on the U.S.-Panama 
FTA, the ITAC-15 advisory group noted that at least one FTA partner (Bahrain) has implemented 
non-compliant legislation and urged USTR to carefully “review all implementing legislation after 
it has been adopted to ensure that no FTA enters into force until compliance is achieved.”  
PANAMA ITAC REPORT, supra note 129, at 3. 
  The United States has also encountered implementation (through enforcement) of almost 
every recent FTA.  See PERU ITAC REPORT, supra note 129, at 6 (noting implementation 
problems that U.S. industry has encountered in Jordan, Chile, Australia, Singapore and some of 
the DR-CAFTA countries, including the Dominican Republic, and Bahrain). 
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relatively open, and that will not change.  Empirical evidence from the 
Mexican experience suggests that trade volumes will grow and that the United 
States will absorb an even greater proportion of the FTA partner’s trade.159  
The developing country may, as Mexico has done, find that its business cycle 
even comes to correspond to that of the United States.160  What a developing 
country needs, however, for the FTA to be successful, is effective market 
access.  There are constraints on such access.  The FTA partner must have the 
ability to exploit the U.S. market by having exports of value and be able to 
satisfy U.S. standards.161  Additionally, the developing country must be able to 
export even in the face of regular U.S. use of unfair trade statutes. 
With regard to the issue of foreign direct investment, a U.S. FTA can be 
very valuable.  Returning to the Mexican illustration, Mexico saw growth in 
investment following NAFTA.162  Additionally, it has continued to be one of 
the top developing country recipients of Foreign Directive Investment (FDI).  
Higher levels of investment, however, are not guaranteed and are not the only 
measure of the success of an FTA.  Mexico’s experience with NAFTA 
provides a valuable measuring rod and comparison.  As the first move toward 
 
 159. Before NAFTA, Mexico faced a trade deficit with the United States.  Ten years after its 
entry into force it was running a trade surplus of $28.9 billion.  See Oliver, supra note 80, at 74. 
Mexico is also more important trading partner of the U.S.—the second most important market for 
U.S. agriculture exports.  Press Release, USTR, U.S.-Mexican Officials Meet to Discuss NAFTA 
(Jan. 11, 2008), http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2008/January/US_ 
Mexican_Officials_Meet_to_Discuss_NAFTA.html.  See also Trade and Development Report, 
2007, supra note 6, at 70 (noting the increase in intraregional trade for Mexico as a result of 
NAFTA and the focus of those exports on the United States so that Mexico is “the developing 
country with the highest concentration of exports to a single destination and the one with the 
largest increase in export opportunities from world import demand growth”). 
 160. Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 66. 
 161. U.S. standards pose greater compliance costs for developing countries trying to enter a 
developed country’s market since they are “mainly standard-takers not standard makers.”  
Globalization for Development, supra note 11, at 6.  The costs for compliance are estimated to 
cause a 10% decrease on potential export earnings.  Globalization for Development, supra note 
11, at 6.  The United States did make efforts during the DR-CAFTA negotiating process to begin 
working with the Central American countries on how to satisfy U.S. standards for particular 
products of major export interest to those countries.  DR-CAFTA Report, supra note 83, at 35.  
The negotiations also discussed support for technical assistance on standards issues and 
commitments were made for a continuation of such assistance from the U.S. and Sanitary and 
agricultural agencies.  DR-CAFTA Report, supra note 83, at 35 n.7. 
 162. Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 74 (investment levels almost 
quadrupled from the period before NAFTA (1990–94) when they averaged $5 per year to 2000–
2004 when they were $19 billion per year).  The United States has been the largest source of 
FDI—contributing sixty-four percent of Mexico’s FDI in 2006.  See Tamara Lothian & Katharina 
Pistor, Local Institutions, Foreign Investment and Alternative Strategies for Development: Some 
Views From Practice, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 101, 109 (2003) (Investment law plays a 
minor role in the decision to enter a market and other factors play a role—access to new 
materials, size/scope of the market, geographic position of the country compared to others.). 
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an open investment environment and as a geographically contiguous trading 
partner, Mexico was in a privileged position to gain additional investment.  
The other developing countries in Latin America—DR-CAFTA, Colombia, 
Peru, Panama—will not share either of Mexico’s advantages.  It is fairly clear 
that having a pro-investment legal regime is one of the reasons investment 
flows increase.  However, other factors are now widely recognized as being 
crucial, if not exactly equal, determinants of where investments are made.163  
The recent U.S. developing country FTA partners have preconditions—
underdeveloped infrastructure (particularly transport, telecommunications and 
ports),164 underdeveloped workforce (relatively low levels of education and 
skills),165 weak macroeconomic policy166 and governance problems (security 
and corruption)167—that could limit relatively high investment levels until 
these issues are addressed.  The U.S. FTA will provide some assistance 
through trade capacity building168 and the implementation of services 
 
 163. Countries have to make investments in the things that are necessary to attract 
investment—physical infrastructure (transport), telecommunications, institutional and regulatory 
reforms.  See DR-CAFTA Report, supra note 83, at 2. 
 164. See id. (specifying that all of the Central American countries have to work on 
transportation issues (road quality and diversity) and ports). 
 165. See id. at 11–12 (noting that all of the Central American countries need to work on 
secondary education and some—Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua—on primary education). 
 166. The decisions countries make on these issues can be crucial to what happens to a 
country’s economic growth and development.  It is difficult to assess exactly how NAFTA has 
impacted Mexico in part because of the effects of Mexico’s use of capital inflows before NAFTA 
and its approach to inflation (anchoring the peso to the U.S. dollar).  Going into NAFTA, Mexico 
had an overvalued currency and a significant current account deficit.  Trade and Development 
Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 74. 
 167. DR-CAFTA Report, supra note 83, at 11–12 (noting the work that several Central 
American countries must do on governance issues). 
 168. The U.S. commitment to trade capacity in the model FTAs is to create a committee on 
Trade Capacity Building for each agreement.  The developing country partners are expected to 
periodically update and provide the Committee its national trade capacity building strategy.  In 
turn the Committee will seek to: (1) prioritize projects at a national or regional level (or both); (2) 
invite donor institutions and other groups to assist in developing and implementing the projects; 
(3) assist with the implementation of projects; and (4) monitor and assess progress in 
implementing progress.  The TCB Committee is required to meet at least twice a year during the 
transition period. 
  The TCB Chapter is notable for what it lacks.  There is no textual commitment to 
financial assistance by the United States for these projects.  The United States does provide such 
assistance through a general trade capacity building aimed at all trading partners.  See infra note 
184.  The fact that a developing country is a free trade agreement partner, however, does not 
necessarily guarantee it more assistance or more timely assistance. 
  The United States provided $7.1 billion in trade capacity building assistance from 2001–
2007.  Latin America and the Caribbean area have received $1.9 billion during that time frame 
and $554 million in 2007.  US/TPR, supra note 21, at 23.  The Central American countries have 
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liberalization for infrastructure issues.169  The other constraints, however, fall 
largely outside the parameters of the FTA.  Investment also cannot be dictated.  
The developing country may not get investment of the type that will facilitate 
technology transfer and help the country move up the industrial policy 
chain.170  Lesser-developed countries in a regional country grouping, such as 
Honduras and Nicaragua in DR-CAFTA, will undoubtedly find themselves 
less preferred investment targets than their more developed partners.171 
Extensive service sector liberalization will probably create more efficient 
and competitive services.172  Developing countries stand to gain particularly 
 
received $650 million in trade-related assistance since 2003, and it has focused on rural and 
poverty reduction.  CAFTA-DR FACTS, supra note 95. 
  The largest recent contributions come from the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC) and focus on infrastructure development agricultural issues.  These include a $215 million 
dollar compact with Honduras to upgrade roads and promote agricultural development (June 
2005); a $175 million dollar compact with Nicaragua (July 2005) to improve highways to link 
producers to regional marketing; and a $461 million compact with El Salvador to deal with 
promoting education, enterprise development and transport infrastructure.  Id. 
  Not all of the DR-CAFTA countries have benefitted from the MCC program.  Although 
they are eligible for assistance, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic have not yet satisfied the 
eligibility requirements for an MCC compact.  Id. 
 169. For example, the FTA opening services sectors, such as telecommunications, should 
attract outside investment, which will result in the upgrading of this type of infrastructure. 
 170. Mexico offers an illustration of this phenomenon.  Mexican producers have become part 
of a regional industrial bloc.  Thus far, however, Mexico has not been able to move significantly 
up the production chain into full-scale production of skill- and technology-intensive goods.  
Instead, Mexican companies have been “involved mainly in the low-skill, assembly stages of the 
production of such goods.  Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 72.  See also 
Oliver, supra note 80, at 83 (noting that export manufacturing “tends to be based on a production 
model in which component parts are imported to Mexico for processing or assembly and then re-
exported[,]” and that Mexico would need to shift more to a model in which domestic firms 
constituted a larger part of the chain of production to have spill over effects on other parts of the 
economy). 
 171. Costa Rica is the most developed of the DR-CAFTA countries.  It has already become a 
center for computer-related industries in Latin America.  Leading U.S. producers Cisco Systems, 
Oracle, Hewlett-Packard and Intel all have major operations in the country.  Business News 
Americas, supra note 26. Costa Rica has been better at attracting such investments because 
“higher quality of its research institutions and collaboration with private firms.”  DR-CAFTA 
Report, supra note 83, at 92. 
  Even so, Costa Rica still has much work to do on its own investments in research and 
development, which are low compared to countries of the same size, labor force and exports to 
the United States.  DR-CAFTA Report, supra note 83, at 192–94.  According to the World Bank, 
this is linked to deficiencies in “the area of financial depth, the production of intellectual property 
rights, the ability to mobilize government resources, and the quality of research institutions.”  Id. 
at 194. 
 172. Increased services can generate “significant development gains”—far more than from 
increasing exports of primary commodities and manufacturers alone.  See Globalization For 
Development, supra note 11, at 39.  In order to achieve development—enhancing liberalization—
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from liberalizing financial services and traditional utility monopolies.  One 
consequence, however, may be the loss of ownership by local service providers 
without necessarily improving credit availability for the developing country.173 
Recent economics scholarship174 and analyses of the impact of U.S. free 
trade agreements on developing country partners175 point to similar 
conclusions.  Trade liberalization and financial openness alone are not enough 
to create economic growth and development.  To benefit from undertaking 
trade-linked reforms, the developing country needs to cultivate a 
complementary domestic policy agenda.176  In the case of a developing country 
entering into a U.S. FTA, the development strategy must cover not only the 
implementation demands of the FTA but also industrial policy as well as 
institutional and governance reform.177  To be effective, this domestic agenda 
must confront the binding constraints a particular country faces in its 
integration into the global economy.178  This prescription for a developing 
 
a development country has to emphasize the role of regulation and a national services strategy.  
Id. at 40, 44. 
 173. See Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 76–77 (noting that while 
foreign ownership of the banking system in Mexico has risen to approximately 80% this has not 
led to improved credit access for Mexican firms). 
 174. See generally Ricardo Hausmann, Dani Rodrik & Andres Velasco, Growth Diagnostics 
in THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
(Narcis Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., Oxford 2008).  See also Dani Rodrik, The New 
Development Economics: We Shall Experiment, But How Shall We Learn? 24–28 (May 21, 
2008) (unpublished paper, Harvard University), available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/ 
~drodrik/The%20New%20Development%20Economics.pdf (discussing the new development 
economics approach as one based on developing country-specific growth strategic and 
innovations in industrial policy); Yong Shik Lee, Foreign Direct Investment and Regional Trade 
Liberalization: A Viable Answer for Economic Development, 39 J. WORLD TRADE 701 (2003); 
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Swimming in the Spaghetti Bowl: Challenges for 
Developing Countries Under The “New Regionalism,” (2004) (prepared by Luis Abugattas 
Majluf), available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtab28_en.pdf. 
 175. See LESSONS FROM NAFTA, supra note 80; DR-CAFTA Report, supra note 83. 
 176. Institutional and regulatory reforms are necessary for firms and workers in developing 
countries to seek out the opportunities that come from an FTA.  DR-CAFTA, supra note 83, at 
174.  The Central American countries suffer from an excessive regulation (which slows down 
start up times for firms) and relatively high levels of administrative corruption which can also 
impose costs on FTA opportunities.  Id. at 174, 185–88. 
 177. WORLD BANK, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 1990S: LEARNING FROM A DECADE OF 
REFORMS 147–48 (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 
2005), available at http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/lessons1990s/chaps/05-Ch05_kl.pdf 
(evaluating what actually happened to developing countries pursuing globalization and also notes 
that signing regional agreements “will not generate positive export and growth responses unless 
the countries themselves also pursue other necessary economic, political, and social reforms”). 
 178. DR-CAFTA Report, supra note 83, at 2, 174–201 (analyzing what the DR-CAFTA 
countries will have to work on with regard to trade facilitations, institutional reform (including 
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country—that it focus on the particular constraints it faces—is a difficult one 
for a country entering into a U.S. FTA.  One effect of the model FTA is that it 
dictates many crucial decisions for a developing country concerning the pace 
and extent of trade and investment liberalization and the content of its 
regulatory approach to services, intellectual property and standards.  It can be 
fairly characterized as a “one size fits all” prescription for how to develop.  
Accepting this model results in a loss of policy space for a country to deal with 
its particular limitations.179  Some of the suggested policy approaches that 
might aid a developing country—caution in embracing import liberalization, 
subsidizing exports and controlling how to deal with intellectual property 
rights—are taken off the table by a U.S. FTA.180 
Policy space, however, is never infinite in a globalized world.  No country, 
particularly a small developing country, has the freedom to develop 
undisturbed.  One feature of the world a developing country faces is a global 
legal system that pushes for goals sought by developed countries.  If it appears 
the advantages to be gained from joining a U.S. FTA or the risks of isolation 
by staying out are too high, a developing country will pursue the free trade 
agreement.  Consequently, what a developing country must figure out is how 
to create a national development strategy that complements the free trade 
directives.  What remains available are investments in infrastructure and 
human capital constraints and subsidies for regional development within the 
country.  Mexico has made some steps in these directions but, even after 
fifteen years, has not gone far enough to reach some of the development goals 
of NAFTA.181 
V.  WHAT IF THE UNITED STATES COMMITTED TO ALTERING THE MODEL TO 
EMBRACE DEVELOPMENT? 
If the United States wants to aid in the development of its closest 
developing trading partners, it needs to reconfigure the model FTA.  What 
would it take to achieve such a reconfiguration?  The first requirement would 
be for the United States to embrace its role in leading developmental 
assistance.  One way to do this would be to use the laboratory of its recent 
bilateral FTAs to figure out what would help its developing country partners 
 
anti-corruption efforts) and commitments to education and the research and development needed 
for innovation). 
 179. See generally Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 57–65 (providing a 
complete analysis of all of the ways in which a developing country entering into a North-South 
FTA can lose policy space). 
 180. See Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 65; Dani Rodrik, How to 
Save Globalization from its Cheerleaders 13–15 (Sept. 2007) (unpublished paper, Harvard 
University); Lee, supra note 174, at 706–11. 
 181. Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 65–81. 
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adjust to the globalized world.  Such a reconfiguration would be valuable at a 
time when the EC is also making moves in this direction.182 
In order to achieve such a reconfiguration, a shift by both Congress and the 
Executive Branch would be required.  Congress has used its trade promotion 
authority in the past to constrain the President and to focus largely on domestic 
impacts that occur when the United States makes trade policy.  Large changes 
would therefore be needed for Congress to shift.  Adding development 
assistance as a negotiating objective and gaining a greater voice over FTA 
partner selection183—with potential developmental success as a key rationale—
would change U.S. policy.  The forthcoming debate on TPA authority that 
awaits President Obama would offer the opportunity for such a shift by 
Congress. 
There would also have to be a shift by the executive branch.  The President 
would have to put multilateralism first and focus executive energies and 
commitments on breaking through the recent impasses at the WTO.  By 
completing a Doha Round that offers enough discipline over agriculture to aid 
developing countries, the United States would achieve a true breakthrough for 
developing countries.  Such a shift would require the United States to abandon 
the “competitive liberalization” approach and substitute it with a focus on 
making its laboratory of FTAs models of good development policy.  Instead, 
 
 182. The EC has also been pursuing regionalism during the slow down period at the WTO.  
See id.  The most recent effort of the EC is its negotiating of Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPA).  See id. at 56.  These agreements—replacing the long-standing preference programs with 
the ACP countries—place an overt focus on development.  Id.  These agreements are with 
countries that closely resemble recent U.S. FTA partners.  In the EPA the EC completed late in 
2007 with the CARIFORUM states, the parties “reaffirm the objective of sustainable 
development[,]” recognize that “development cooperation is a crucial element of their 
Partnership” and that this cooperation can take financial and non-financial forms.”  Economic 
Partnership Agreement Between the CARIFORUM States, of the One Part, and the European 
Community and its Member States of the Other Part 13, 16, Dec. 17, 2007, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/february/tradoc_137971.pdf.  The EC commits itself to 
the financing pertaining to development cooperation out of its general budget.  Id. at 17. 
  The EPA also contains cooperation priorities aimed at the biggest adjustment problems 
the CARIFORUM states will face by entering into a free trade agreement with the EC—
assistance for capacity/institution building for tax administration assist with the loss of revenues 
from tariffs; support for the private sector and enterprise development and the diversifying 
exports through new investment and the development of new sectors; assist with development of 
and compliance with standards; and support for the development of infrastructure.  Id. at 18–19. 
 183. In an earlier version of “fast track” (the Tariff and Trade Act of 1974) there was a 
requirement that the President notify Congress of the intent to begin trade negotiations at least 
sixty days in advance.  Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 401(a), 98 Stat. 2948 
(1984). This “gatekeeper” provision allows either the House of the Senate the option of denying 
fast track treatment by voting to disapprove of the negotiations.  GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 
45, at 48, app. II.  The TPA did not include this provision.  Id.  According to the GAO, the former 
USTR negotiators it interviewed were opposed to the reinclusion of the provision.  Id. 
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the President should alter the model FTA and shape any new agreements into 
laboratories for good development policy.  One part of this shift would have to 
include restraint on pushing for any more U.S.-level commitments by FTA 
partners.   
In order to achieve its new goal, the United States would have to make a 
full-scale commitment to more effective trade capacity building.184  In this 
reconfiguration, trade capacity building would play a central role in the model 
FTA.  The United States would need to continue using a TCB working 
committee during negotiations to isolate the key constraints its trading partner 
would face in accepting and implementing an FTA.  It would have to do this in 
conjunction with the national development strategy put forward by the FTA 
partner.  The United States would then have to work with that country to gear 
up TCB projects that would start as soon as the FTA is enacted in the United 
States—as opposed to the later entry into force for its partner—so that a 
developing country partner would have immediate help to adjust during the 
implementation period.  The contents of the TCB program would have to 
require not only financial resources, but also technical assistance (expertise and 
training) in each area noted by the national development strategy.  
Every trade capacity project would then have to be assessed (for 
completion and success) and adopted in response to experiences learned.  
Developing country FTA partners would benefit from such a reconfiguration 
of the model.  However, the United States would also gain.  Trading partners 
achieving higher levels of growth and convergence with developed countries’ 
standards would export fewer of their problems185 to the United States.  More 
importantly, the United States could establish a reputation as the true leader of 
developed-focused multilateralism. 
 
 184. The current TCB program lacks systematic monitoring of TCB projects and has not 
developed performance indicators or compiled performance data about projects.  GAO 2005 
REPORT, supra note 143, at 29.  Despite making substantial financial commitments to TCB 
programs, the U.S. agencies involved have not “specifically conducted program evaluations to 
assess the effectiveness of their trade capacity building efforts.”  Id. 
  To improve how it does trade capacity building, the United States needs to think through 
what role it wants for the program.  A systematic diagnosis of the adjustment issues faced by 
developing country partners (available from work conducted by the World Bank) would be a 
starting point.  Then, if the goal is to demonstrate how the FTA can complement development, 
TCB projects would need to be driven by the national development strategy of the developing 
country partner. 
 185. The most obvious export is illegal immigration caused by the structural problems of the 
Mexican economy brought on in part by its adjustments to NAFTA (particularly the loss of jobs 
in the agriculture sector).  See Trade and Development Report, 2007, supra note 6, at 77–78 
(estimating that the number of Mexicans living in the United States without legal resident permits 
was approximately six million in 2005).  See also Oliver, supra note 80, at 117–30 (providing a 
complete discussion of the reasons for the emigration of Mexican citizens). 
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